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Proposition 8: California Law After In re Lance W.
and People v. Castro
Until recently, California provided a relatively high level of constitutional
protection to criminal defendants. With the passage of Proposition 8 in 1982,
the California voters expressed their desire to decrease this level of protection
in order to remove impediments to the effective prosecution of criminally ac-
cuseds. This comment will examine two of the major provisions of Proposi-
tion 8 and their effect on California law in light of major cases decided by the
California Supreme Court in 1985.
I. INTRODUCTION
In our system of federalism, state constitutions have a significant
role to play as protectors of individual rights and liberties. State
courts have traditionally interpreted state constitutional criminal
provisions as the equivalent of the corresponding federal rights.'
Since the Warren Court's standards of protection were so extensive,
state courts seldom required more than the federal minimum.2 How-
ever, in the last decade, since the Burger Court has limited the reach
of the broader Warren Court decisions, state courts have gradually
turned to their own constitutions as a source for expanding the scope
of criminal procedural rights.3 This approach has been further en-
couraged by decisions of the Supreme Court which have left no doubt
that the state courts are free to ignore the Supreme Court's less ex-
pansive interpretations of analogous federal constitutional provisions
when deciding a case on state constitutional grounds.4
Through numerous decisions, the Supreme Court has developed a
body of constitutional law in the areas of criminal procedure that
guides the behavior of state courts as well as their federal counter-
parts. By way of the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment, the Court has applied to the states nearly all the criminal
procedural safeguards of the fourth, fifth, sixth, and eighth
1. Comment, Developments in the Law--The Interpretation of State Constitu-
tional Rights, 95 HARv. L. REV. 1324, 1368 (1982).
2. C. WHITEBREAD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-AN ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL
CASES AND CONCEPTS 592 (1980). See also Comment, 1982 California Courts of Appeal
Survey: Search and Seizure, 5 WHrrrIER L. REv. 201, 207 (1983).
3. Comment, supra note 1, at 1368-69.
4. 1& at 1369.
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amendments. 5
The passage of Proposition 8 in California on June 8, 1982 severely
limited California state courts' ability to utilize the doctrine of in-
dependent state grounds in certain areas of criminal procedure. This
comment seeks to examine the viability of prior interpretations by
California courts in the areas of criminal procedure in light of the
passage of the initiative. Since an understanding of the doctrine of
independent state grounds is necessary for a full comprehension of
the Proposition, the history and development of the doctrine in Cali-
fornia will first be briefly outlined. The purpose and direct effect of
Proposition 8 on the California Constitution will be discussed, fol-
lowed by a comparison of relevant pre-Proposition 8 California cases
with United States Supreme Court cases illustrating the distinctive
features of California law of criminal procedure in place at the time
Proposition 8 was passed. Finally, the comment will examine legal
challenges to the Proposition, and the future course of California law
in light of leading cases reflecting the impact of Proposition 8.
II. HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF INDEPENDENT STATE GROUNDS
IN CALIFORNIA
The doctrine of independent state grounds has been firmly estab-
lished in the decisions of the United States Supreme Court since
5. 1& at 1367. The text of these amendments reads as follows:
AMENDMENT IV
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and ef-
fects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirma-
tion, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.
AMENDMENT V
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime,
unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases aris-
ing in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time
of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence
to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any crimi-
nal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for
public use, without just compensation.
AMENDMENT VI
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime
shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascer-
tained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to
be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his
defense.
AMENDMENT VIII
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel
and unusual punishments inflicted.
For a list of representative cases holding these protections applicable to the states, see
Comment, supra note 1, at 1367 n.1.
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Cooper v. California.6 In that case, the defendant was arrested for
violation of narcotics laws and his automobile was seized pursuant to
a California statute authorizing such seizure. The statute further
provided for delivery of the vehicle to the Division of Narcotic En-
forcement, to be held as evidence until forfeiture was declared or re-
lease ordered. In holding that a warrantless search one week after
the defendant's arrest was not unreasonable under the fourth amend-
ment, Justice Black, writing for the majority, noted that "[o]ur hold-
ing ... does not affect the State's power to impose higher standards
on searches and seizures than required by the Federal Constitution if
it chooses to do so." 7
Recognition of an adequate independent state ground precludes re-
view by the United States Supreme Court.s Therefore, a state court
which bases its ruling on its own constitution may effectively avoid
Supreme Court scrutiny. The result is that law enforcement officials
will be unable to obtain relief in a federal forum in any case in which
the state decision is based on state constitutional requirements
broader than those of the federal constitution.9
The definitive case on independent state grounds in California is
the case of People v. Brisendine.O In Brisendine, the California
Supreme Court invalidated a search of the defendant's knapsack af-
ter his apprehension for a fire ordinance violation. The court rea-
soned that the officers who arrested the defendant and other
campers in a forest area had a legitimate concern for their own safety
because of the need to escort the arrestees a considerable distance
out of the forest, and hence were justified in conducting a simple pat-
down of the defendant's knapsack for weapons.'1 Additionally, the
court reasoned that the officers were justified in looking inside the
6. 386 U.s. 58 (1967).
7. Id. at 62. See also Jankovich v. Indiana Toll Road Commission, 379 U.S. 487,
491-92 (1965) ("even though a state court's opinion relies on similar provisions in both
the State and Federal Constitutions, the state constitutional provision has been held to
provide an independent and adequate ground of decision").
8. Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 125-26 (1945).
9. See C. WHITEBREAD, supra note 2, at 593.
10. 13 Cal. 3d 528, 531 P.2d 1099, 119 Cal. Rptr. 315 (1975).
11. Id. at 535-37, 531 P.2d at 1103-04, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 319-20. The defendant and
his fellow campers had been arrested for having an open campfire in a designated
"high fire hazard area" in which both open campfires and overnight camping were pro-
hibited. Because the officers had left their citation books in their patrol car and be-
cause of the prohibition against camping, the campers were escorted out of the forest
area. The officers' concern for safety was heightened because of several adverse fac-
tors. The journey back took about two hours, much of which was in darkness due to
the failure of the officers' flashlights. Also, the journey required strenuous climbing in
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knapsack, since this pat-down search proved insufficient to allay fear
that the interior might contain a weapon.12 However, the court con-
cluded that the legitimate scope of the search was exceeded when the
officers searched a closed bottle in the knapsack, in which narcotics
were discovered, reasoning that such action could not rationally be
claimed to be necessary for the officers' protection.13
The California Supreme Court in Brisendine chose to ignore the
existing case law established by the United States Supreme Court in
United States v. Robinson14 and Gustafson v. F/orida.'5 Under the
standards enunciated in these cases, the entire search would have
been legal. Instead, relying on Cooper v. Californial6 and Jankovich
v. Indiana Toll Road Commission,17 the court indicated that it was
not bound to follow Robinson and Gustafson since they prescribed
only the minimum threshold requirements to survive the fourth
amendment proscription on unreasonable searches and seizures.
Although the wording of the provision protecting against unreason-
able searches and seizures in California's constitution is similar to
that of the United States Constitution,' 8 a stricter interpretation and
higher California standard was justified by the court in Brisendine
by stating that "[i]t is a fiction too long accepted that provisions in
state constitutions textually identical to the Bill of Rights were in-
tended to mirror their federal counterpart."19 The basis for the
court's decision rested "exclusively on article I, section 13, of the Cal-
ifornia Constitution, which requires a more exacting standard for
cases arising within this state,"20 and from the people's adoption of
article I, section 24 in which it was declared that, "'[r]ights guaran-
which it was necessary for the campers to aid each other. Much of the time, the of-
ficers had no idea where each of the arrestees was.
12. I& at 543, 531 P.2d at 1108, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 324.
13. I& The court cited People v. Collins, 1 Cal. 3d 658, 663, 463 P.2d 403, 406, 83
Cal. Rptr. 179, 182 (1970), in which it was stated that:
an officer who exceeds a pat-down without first discovering an object which
feels reasonably like a knife, gun, or club must be able to point to specific and
articulable facts which reasonably support a suspicion that the particular sus-
pect is armed with an atypical weapon which would feel like the object felt
during the pat-down.
IdL
14. 414 U.S. 218 (1973). See infra note 48 for the facts of the case.
15. 414 U.S. 260 (1973). In this case, the defendant was arrested for driving with-
out having a valid driver's license in his possession. During a pat-down search, the ar-
resting officer found and seized marijuana cigarettes. The defendant was later tried
and convicted of unlawful possession. Upholding the conviction, the Supreme Court
held that a full search of a suspect incident to a lawful custodial arrest did not violate
the fourth amendment.
16. 386 U.S. 58 (1967).
17. 379 U.S. 487 (1965).
18. See supra note 5 for the wording of U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The language is
mirrored in CAL. CONST. art. I, § 13.
19. 13 Cal. 3d at 550, 531 P.2d at 1113, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 329.
20. Id. at 545, 531 P.2d at 1110, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 326 (emphasis added).
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teed by this Constitution are not dependent on those guaranteed by
the United States Constitution.' "21
By reading these two constitutional provisions together, the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court justified its stricter interpretation of a clause
identical to that in the United States Constitution and invoked the
doctrine of independent state grounds to its fullest. California courts
have thus determined that the California Constitution is and always
has been a document of independent force.22 Accordingly, California
courts have secured greater rights for its citizens in many areas than
those guaranteed by the federal Constitution. The practical effect
has been the suppression of evidence which would otherwise be ad-
missible under federal law.
III. PROPOSITION 8
In response to California voters' desire to change certain existing
provisions of the California Constitution, Proposition 8, known as
"The Victim's Bill of Rights," was passed on June 8, 1982. Section 3
of the initiative added section 28(a) to article I of the California Con-
stitution. The section provides a statement of the purpose of amend-
ing the California Constitution:
The People of the State of California find and declare that the enactment of
comprehensive provisions and laws ensuring a bill of rights for victims of
crime, including safeguards in the criminal justice system to fully protect
those rights, is a matter of grave statewide concern.
The rights of victims pervade the criminal justice system, encompassing not
only the right to restitution from the wrongdoers for financial losses suffered
as a result of criminal acts, but also the more basic expectation that persons
who commit felonious acts causing injury to innocent victims will be appropri-
ately detained in custody, tried by the courts, and sufficiently punished so that
the public safety is protected and encouraged as a goal of highest importance
To accomplish these goals, broad reforms in the procedural treatment of ac-
cused persons and the disposition and sentencing of convicted persons are nec-
essary and proper as deterrents to criminal behavior and to serious disruption
of people's lives.2 3
The most prominent of these reforms are discussed below.
A. The Truth-in Evidence Section
One of the most prominent provisions of Proposition 8 is the addi-
21. Id. at 551, 531 P.2d 1114, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 330 (emphasis added) (quoting from
CAL. CONST. art. I, § 24).
22. Id, at 549-50, 531 P.2d at 1113, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 329.
23. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(a).
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tion of section 28(d) to the California Constitution. This section, enti-
tled "Right to Truth-in-Evidence," provides that "relevant evidence
shall not be excluded in any criminal proceeding."24 The Truth-in-
Evidence provision appears, by its plain language, to effectively abol-
ish application of California's exclusionary rule25 wherever that rule
is more strict than its federal counterpart.
Essentially, the initiative gave the voters a choice between the re-
tention of current California standards regarding the, admission ,of
relevant evidence and the less restrictive federal standards. Armed
with the information contained in the voter's pamphlet to the effect
that the proposition would make "radical changes" in the state con-
stitution, the voters nonetheless chose the federal standards.26 The
passage of Proposition 8 was therefore "a clear repudiation, by the
people, of state law embellishments on federal decisions which oper-
ate to exclude relevant evidence from criminal proceedings." 27
24. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(d). The full text of this provision is as follows:
(d) Right to Truth-in-Evidence. Except as provided by statute hereafter en-
acted by a two-thirds vote of the membership in each house of the Legislature,
relevant evidence shall not be excluded in any criminal proceeding, including
pretrial and post conviction motions and hearings, or in any trial or hearing of
a juvenile for a criminal offense, whether heard in juvenile or adult court.
Nothing in this section shall affect any existing statutory rule of evidence re-
lating to privilege or hearsay, or Evidence Code, Sections 352, 782 or 1103.
Nothing in this section shall affect any existing statutory or constitutional
right of the press.
Id.
25. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1538.5 (West Supp. 1984). The relevant portions of the
California exclusionary rule provide as follows:
(a) Grounds. A defendant may move. . . to suppress as evidence any tangi-
ble or intangible thing obtained as a result of a search or seizure on either of
the following grounds:
(1) The search or seizure without a warrant was unreasonable.
(2) The search or seizure with a warrant was unreasonable because (i) the
warrant is insufficient on its face; (ii) the property or evidence obtained is not
that described in the warrant; (iii) there was not probable cause for the issu-
ance of the warrant; (iv) the method of execution of the warrant violated fed-
eral or state constitutional standards; (v) there was any other violation of
federal or state constitutional standards ....
(d) Effect of Granting Motion. If a search or seizure motion is granted pur-
suant to the proceedings authorized by this section, the. . . evidence shall not
be admissible against the movant at any trial or other hearing unless further
proceedings authorized by this section. . . are utilized by the people.
26. California's exclusionary rule has not been expressly repealed. Therefore, the
effect of Proposition 8 was not to abolish the doctrine in its strictest sense. Rather, the
initiative requires the California Supreme Court to interpret what constitutes an un-
reasonable search and seizure in a manner consistent with that of the United States
Supreme Court. The effect is really to redefine what constitutes an illegal search. The
exclusionary rule still exists and may be appropriately invoked in all cases in which
the United States Supreme Court finds the search to be unreasonable. See Comment,
supra note 2, at 203. An exception to this arises in the area of standing where the
search may be concededly illegal but the aggrieved party is not granted standing to
challenge that illegal search.
27. Wilson v. Superior Court, 134 Cal. App. 3d 173, 212, 670 P.2d 325, 346, 185 Cal.
Rptr. 678, 699 (1982), rev'd 34 Cal. 3d 777, 195 Cal. Rptr. 671 (1983), cert. denied, 104 S.
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One of the evils of pre-Proposition 8 law perceived by the initiative
supporters was the exclusion of relevant evidence in a criminal pros-
ecution. This was suggested in the argument for Proposition 8 that
its passage would "restore balance to the rules governing the use of
evidence against criminals. '28 The Legislative Analyst predicted that
the measure, if adopted, would override the exclusion of "evidence
obtained through ... unlawful searches of persons or property" to
the extent permissible under federal law.29 Proponents of the initia-
tive specifically indicated that the Truth-in-Evidence provision would
not affect the federal restrictions on the use of evidence which func-
tion as the constitutional minimums for protection of individual
rights.30
The primary impact of this constitutional amendment on Califor-
nia law is in cases involving the exclusionary rule. A different result
will be required, departing from existing case law in which the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court has exercised its prerogative of deciding the
case on independent state grounds and, in so doing, has excluded evi-
dence which would otherwise be admissible under the body of federal
constitutional law. The Truth-in-Evidence provision purports to
eliminate this more expansive evidentiary exclusionary rule which is
based on the California Constitution. After this additional layer of
criminal procedural rights is removed, the decisional law of the
United States Supreme Court, as derived from its interpretation of
the federal Constitution, would then become the relevant authority.
Under the system of stare decisis, California courts are obligated to
follow the decisions of the United States Supreme Court in the lat-
ter's interpretation of federal constitutional safeguards. 3 1 Further-
more, the supremacy clause of the Constitution 32 requires that the
federal exclusionary rule, made applicable to the states in Mapp v.
Ohio,33 must still be followed by the California Supreme Court.
Ct. 1929 (1984). This case was reversed based on a determination by the California
Supreme Court that not even the federal standards were met. Accordingly, the court
never reached the Proposition 8 issues.
28. Ballot Pamp., Proposed Amend. to Cal. Const. with Argument to Voters, Pri-
mary Elec. (June 8,1982), Argument in Favor of Proposition 8, Mike Curb, Lieutenant
Governor, p. 34.
29. Id. at 32.
30. Id.
31. Calderon v. City of Los Angeles, 4 Cal. 3d 251, 259, 481 P.2d 489, 493, 93 Cal.
Rptr. 361, 365 (1971). See also People v. Hannon, 19 Cal. 3d 588, 606, 564 P.2d 1203,
1214, 138 Cal. Rptr. 885, 896 (1977).
32. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
33. 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (the right to privacy embodied in the fourth amendment is
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However, although decisions of lower federal courts on federal ques-
tions may be persuasive authority, they are by no means binding on
California courts.3 4 In the absence of a United States Supreme Court
decision on point, the California Supreme Court is free to interpret
federal constitutional principles as it pleases.35
B. The Use of Prior Convictions Section
Another provision of Proposition 8 that will have a tremendous im-
pact on the manner in which criminal trials are conducted is the sec-
tion entitled "Use of Prior Convictions," which adds section 28(f) to
article I of the California Constitution. This amendment to the Cali-
fornia Constitution provides that prior felony convictions may be
used "without limitation for purposes of impeachment or enhance-
ment of sentence in any criminal proceeding,"36 substantially modify-
ing the evidence rules in effect prior to passage of the initiative.
Before Proposition 8 became effective, evidence of prior felony con-
victions could be used, with certain limitations, to attack the credibil-
ity of a witness.37 However, under section 352 of the California
enforceable against states in the same manner and to like effect as other basic rights
secured by the due process clause).
34. People v. Bradley, 1 Cal. 3d 80, 86, 460 P.2d 129, 132, 81 Cal. Rptr. 457, 460
(1969). See also Gould v. People, 56 Cal. App. 3d 909, 128 Cal. Rptr. 743 (1976), over-
ruled on other grounds, Von Alta v. Scott, 27 Cal. 3d 424, 613 P.2d 210, 166 Cal. Rptr.
149 (1980).
35. Of course, with the destruction of the doctrine of independent state grounds, a
decision by the California Supreme Court in an area not yet decided by the United
States Supreme Court would be subject to federal review.
36. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(f). The full text of this provision is as follows:
(f) Use of Prior Convictions. Any prior felony conviction of any person in
any criminal proceeding, whether adult or juvenile, shall subsequently be
used without limitation for purposes of impeachment or enhancement of sen-
tence in any criminal proceeding. When a prior felony conviction is an ele-
ment of any felony offense, it shall be proven to the trier of fact in open court.
Id.
37. Section 788 of the California Evidence Code provides as follows:
Prior felony conviction. For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a
witness, it may be shown by the examination of the witness or by the record
of the judgment that he has been convicted of a felony unless:
(a) A pardon based on his innocence has been granted to the witness by the
jurisdiction in which he was convicted.
(b) A certificate of rehabilitation and pardon has been granted to the wit-
ness under the provisions of Chapter 3.5 (commencing with Section 4852.01) of
Title 6 of Part 3 of the Penal Code.
(c) The accusatory pleading against the witness has been dismissed under
the provisions of Penal Code Section 1203.4, but this exception does not apply
to any criminal trial where the witness is being prosecuted for a subsequent
offense.
(d) The conviction was under the laws of another jurisdiction and the wit-
ness has been relieved of the penalties and disabilities arising from the convic-
tion pursuant to a procedure substantially equivalent to that referred to in
subdivision (b) or (c).
CAL. EVID. CODE § 788 (West 1966).
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Evidence Code, if the witness was also the defendant, the judge, at
his discretion, could exclude most such evidence as unduly prejudi-
cial to the defendant. 38 California courts have determined that a
prior conviction is unduly prejudicial unless it is for an offense in-
volving dishonesty,3 9 it is not too remote in time,40 and it is not iden-
tical to the crime for which the defendant is being tried.41
Proposition 8's amendment to the California Constitution adding sec-
tion 28(f) indicates that such convictions may be used for impeach-
ment "without limitation," thereby creating a clear conflict between
the constitution and the statute. Since a constitutional provision will
prevail over a conflicting statute, section 352 is rendered inapplicable
to evidence of prior felony convictions introduced for impeachment
purposes.4
Prior to passage of Proposition 8, the California exclusionary rule
in this area was somewhat more restrictive than federal law.43 Fed-
38. Section 352 of the California Evidence Code states that "[t]he court in its dis-
cretion may exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the
probability that its admission will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) cre-
ate substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the
jury." CAL. EVID. CODE § 352 (West 1966) (emphasis added).
39. People v. Spearman, 25 Cal. 3d 107, 114, 599 P.2d 74, 77, 157 Cal. Rptr. 883, 886
(1979).
40. People v. Beagle, 6 Cal. 3d 441, 453, 492 P.2d 1, 8, 99 Cal. Rptr. 313, 320 (1972).
41. People v. Fries, 24 Cal. 3d 222, 230, 594 P.2d 19, 24, 155 Cal. Rptr. 194, 200
(1979).
42. Hale v. Bohannon, 38 Cal. 2d 458, 471, 241 P.2d 4, 11 (1952); Chesney v. Byram,
15 Cal. 2d 460, 464, 101 P.2d 1106, 1108 (1940). But see People v. Castro, 38 Cal. 3d 301,
317, 696 P.2d 111, 121, 211 Cal. Rptr. 719, 729 (1985).
43. Cf. FED. R. EVID. 609. The text of this rule is as follows:
Rule 609. Impeachment by Evidence of Conviction of Crime
(a) General rule. For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness,
evidence that he has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted if elicited
from him or established by public record during cross-examination but only if
the crime (1) was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year
under the law under which he was convicted, and the court determines that
the probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect
to the defendant, or (2) involved dishonesty or false statement, regardless of
the punishment.
(b) Time limit. Evidence of a conviction under this rule is not admissible if
a period of more than ten years has elapsed since the date of the conviction or
of the release of the witness from the confinement imposed for that convic-
tion, whichever is the later date, unless the court determines, in the interests
of justice, that the probative value of the conviction supported by specific facts
and circumstances substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect ....
(c) Effect of pardon, annulment, or certificate of rehabilitation. Evidence of
a conviction is not admissible under this rule if (1) the conviction has been the
subject of a pardon, annulment, certificate of rehabilitation, or other
equivalent procedure based on a finding of the rehabilitation of the person
convicted, and that person has not been convicted of a subsequent crime
1067
eral rules will allow the admission of any felony as long as its proba-
tive value outweighs the prejudice to the defendant, or any crime
involving dishonesty regardless of punishment or any prejudicial ef-
fect.44 California, on the other hand, allowed only felonies involving
dishonesty, and only as long as the probative value was not substan-
tially outweighed by the prejudicial effect.45
Proposition 8 eliminated even the federal limitations, allowing use
of any prior felony for impeachment purposes without regard to prej-
udicial effect, remoteness, or nature of the crime. California is, of
course, under no obligation to follow federal standards as embodied
in the Federal Rules of Evidence, since those standards are not of
constitutional dimension. Any state is free to adopt independent stat-
utes or constitutional provisions as long as those laws do not infringe
on rights protected by the United States Constitution and as long as
there has been no federal preemption. 46 Since no constitutional pro-
tections appear to be involved here,47 California, by Proposition 8,
has mandated law considerably less restrictive than corresponding
federal statutes.
IV. CALIFORNIA LAW OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE BEFORE
PROPOSITION 8
In addition to a stricter California exclusionary rule, the independ-
ent state grounds of the California Constitution and other state stat-
utes have historically resulted in California case law providing other
criminal procedural protections than those provided by the United
States Supreme Court. Proposition 8 was proposed to prevent Cali-
fornia courts from establishing and applying procedural safeguards
for criminal defendants higher than the federal standard mandated
to protect federal constitutional rights.
The historic divergence between California law and federal consti-
tutional standards becomes evident when the two are compared. An
examination of the case law before and immediately after the passage
which was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year, or (2)
the conviction has been the subject of a pardon, annulment, or other
equivalent procedure based on a finding of innocence.Ici
44. I& Even though this rule appears to allow admission of any crime involving
dishonesty, that admissibility is still limited by FED. R. EVID. 403 which requires the
court to exclude otherwise relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially out-
weighed by its prejudicial effect. There is also some limitation, also grounded on po-
tential prejudicial effect, regarding crimes that are too remote in time.
45. See supra note 39 and CAL. EVID. CODE § 352 (West 1966).
46. See the discussion on independent state grounds, supra notes 6-22 and accom-
panying text.
47. It remains to be seen if, in extreme cases, the defendant may have a valid ar-
gument that he has been denied due process or a fair trial. If so, there may then be
some constitutional limitations on this provision.
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of Proposition 8 illustrates the distinctive features of California law,
and suggests the potential impact of the initiative on those features.
In the following pages, the changing status of California law will be
analyzed in the context of federal law in various areas in the field of
criminal procedure. The areas discussed are by no means a compre-
hensive list of all areas potentially affected by Proposition 8, but they
serve to illustrate the possible ramifications of this constitutional
amendment.
A. Exclusionary Rule Cases
1. Searches incident to arrest
Under the rule announced in United States v. Robinson,48 the
Supreme Court held that a full body search incident to any lawful
custodial arrest is reasonable under the fourth amendment, even for
minor offenses such as a traffic arrest. The arrest itself justifies an
incidental search. As a corollary to this, federal law as stated in
Chimel v. California49 permits a search of the area within the imme-
diate control of the arrestee. The justification for this holding was to
prevent the suspect from reaching into the area within his control to
grab a weapon or to attempt to dispose of evidence. The case of New
York v. Belton5O extended this rationale to justify a searc4 incident to
48. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973). In Robinson, an officer, with
probable cause to believe that the defendant was driving with a revoked license, made
a custodial arrest. In accordance with normal procedures, he made a pat-down search
of defendant, in the course of which he felt an object in a coat pocket. He extracted a
cigarette package containing heroin. The court of appeals held that the heroin had
been obtained as a result of a search which violated the fourth amendment. IM at 220-
24. In reversing the lower court, the Supreme Court ruled that:
[a] custodial arrest of a suspect based on probable cause is a reasonable in-
trusion under the Fourth Amendment; that intrusion being lawful, a search
incident to the arrest requires no additional justification. It is the fact of the
lawful arrest which establishes the authority to search, and we hold that in
the case of a lawful custodial arrest a full search of the person is not only an
exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment, but is also a
"reasonable" search under that Amendment.
Id. at 235.
49. 395 U.S. 752 (1969). The police officers in Chimel v. California went to defend-
ant's home with probable cause to arrest him for burglary. After waiting until he ar-
rived home, the police arrested the defendant and searched the entire house and
garage during which stolen coins were found. Id at 753-54. In invalidating the war-
rantless search of the home, the Court stated that an arresting officer may only make
a warrantless search of the person arrested, in order to seize evidence jon his person,
and of the immediate area into which the arrestee might conceivably reach for a
weapon or evidentiary items. I& at 763.
50. 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
1069
arrest of the passenger compartment of a vehicle in which an arres-
tee is riding.51
Employing a strict justification approach, the California Supreme
Court rejected this federal standard in People v. Brisendine52 to re-
quire that any search incident to a custodial arrest be no broader
than necessary under the circumstances. To conduct more than a
mere pat-down search, an officer must be able to show "specific and
articulable facts reasonably supporting his suspicion that the suspect
is armed."53 This approach bars searches incident to arrest for minor
underlying offenses.54 Under the CQimel rationale, the fact of the
arrest itself justifies a search of the area, even without specific ar-
ticulable facts. The Brisendine requirement is much stricter than
that set forth in Chimel.
The California Supreme Court's most recent pronouncement in
this area was in the post-Proposition 8 case of People v. Laiwa.55 In
Laiwa, the court totally ignored an opportunity to rule on Proposi-
51. The facts of New York v. Belton indicate that while defendant was being ar-
rested for speeding, the officer smelled burnt marijuana and saw an envelope of mari-
juana on the floor of the car. After searching the occupants, the officer then searched
defendant's jacket which was in the passenger section of the car. Upon unzipping one
of the pockets, cocaine was discovered. The Court relied on the holding of Chimel in
concluding that the passenger compartment of an automobile might be well within
"'the area into which an arrestee might reach'" for a weapon or for evidence. Id at
460 (quoting Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763). The Belton Court therefore concluded that, with
a valid "custodial arrest" of the occupants of an automobile, an officer may search not
only the passenger compartment, but also any containers found therein. 453 U.S. at
460.
52. 13 Cal. 3d 528, 531 P.2d 1099, 119 Cal. Rptr. 315 (1975). See supra notes 10-13
and accompanying text.
53. Id, at 542, 531 P.2d at 1107-08, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 323-24 (quoting People v. Col-
lins, 1 Cal. 3d 658, 662, 463 P.2d 403, 406, 83 Cal. Rptr. 179, 182 (1970)).
54. Current California case law forbids searches incident to arrest when the of-
fense allows an alternative to jailing, such as cite and release, bail, or a citation to ap-
pear. This is because there is little in those cases to indicate potential danger to the
arresting officers. See, e.g., People v. Superior Court, 7 Cal. 3d 186, 206, 496 P.2d 1205,
1219-20, 101 Cal. Rptr. 837, 851-52 (1972) (when an officer issues a traffic citation, a pat-
down search must be based on specific facts giving him reasonable grounds to believe
that a weapon is hidden on the motorist's person). Other examples of such minor of-
fenses include fire cede violations and misdemeanor traffic citations.
55. 34 Cal. 3d 711, 669 P.2d 1278, 195 Cal. Rptr. 503 (1983). This case dealt with a
defendant who was observed walking "robot-like" and later arrested for being under
the influence of PCP. At the time of arrest, an "accelerated booking search" (one con-
ducted in the field instead of at the police station) was conducted in which a closed
tote bag was taken from the defendant and, when opened, yielded a PCP-laced ciga-
rette. In upholding defendant's motion to suppress, the court held that an accelerated
booking search is not an exception to the search warrant requirement. The rationale
was that a booking search of a person in public is a greater invasion of privacy than if
it were conducted "in the relatively sequestered milieu of the property room of a po-
lice station." Id. at 726, 669 P.2d at 1287, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 512. The court further stated
that the real purposes of a booking search (inventory of belongings and jail safety) are
not served by the accelerated booking search, and therefore the justifications for such
a search cannot be the same. Id.
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tion 8 by deciding the case solely on California law prior to the pas-
sage of the initiative. Had Proposition 8 been applied, the legality of
an accelerated booking search incident to the arrest of defendant
would never have been questioned, since the search of the defend-
ant's tote bag would have been justified under New York v. Belton.
The effect of Proposition 8 in this area is to restore the "bright-line"
tests of Robinson and Belton, and in so doing, expand the scope of ad-
missible evidence against defendants.
2. Searches conducted by a private party
The federal exclusionary rule regarding evidence obtained as the
result of an illegal search pertains only to the fruits of searches con-
ducted by government agents; the prosecution may use evidence
which was independently and unlawfully seized by private persons.5 6
Private security guards are considered to be private citizens,57 and ev-
idence obtained by them illegally is thus not subject to fourth amend-
ment provisions.
By comparison, California has extended the application of the ex-
clusionary rule in People v. Zelinski 58 to protect one's right of pri-
vacy against searches conducted by private security personnel. The
court relied on United States v. Price5 9 in stating that "a person does
not need to be an officer of the state to act under color of law and
therefore be responsible, along with such officers, for actions prohib-
ited to state officials when such actions are engaged in under color of
law."60
56. Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475 (1921). In Burdeau, some of defend-
ant's papers were unlawfully taken from his room by a private person without his con-
sent and given to government officials for use against defendant in an indictment.
Because the Court found no evidence that any government agent participated in or
knew of the seizure, there was no reason why use could not be made of the evidence.
See also United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 354 (1974).
57. United States v. Francoeur, 547 F.2d 891, 893-94 (5th Cir.), cerL denied, 431
U.S. 932 (1977).
58. 24 Cal. 3d 357, 594 P.2d 1000, 155 Cal. Rptr. 575 (1979). A private store detec-
tive at Zody's Department Store saw defendant shoplifting. After arresting her, he
searched her purse and found heroin. The defendant was later charged with posses-
sion of the heroin. The court held that, although the store personnel were authorized
to arrest or detain the defendant and conduct a weapons search, they exceeded their
authority in searching further. The purse search was invalidated. Id. at 364, 594 P.2d
at 1004, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 579.
59. 383 U.S. 787 (1966).
60. People v. Zelinski, 24 Cal. 3d at 367, 594 P.2d at 1006, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 581 (cit-
ing United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794 (1966)). Curiously, although the court ac-
corded private security guards the status of government agents for purposes of
applying the exclusionary rule, it failed to allow them the right to search incident to
1071
Applying Proposition 8 in this case would change California law
and bring it in line with the federal standard of Burdeau v. McDow-
ell.6 1 The extra protection offered the criminal defendant in this
area would correspondingly decrease.
3. Automobile searches
Federal law currently provides for two exceptions to the search
warrant requirement for automobile searches. First, in New York v.
Belton,62 the Court held that after a lawful custodial arrest of an oc-
cupant of an automobile, an officer may, "as a contemporaneous inci-
dent of that arrest, search the passenger compartment" of the vehicle
without a warrant.6 3 Second, United States v. Ross64 established a
'%right-line" test in holding that, when police officers have probable
cause to stop an automobile on the street, and the object of their
search is not some specifically identifiable container known to be in-
side, they may search the entire car, including the trunk, and open
any packages or containers they may find therein, whether they have
a search warrant or not.6 5
Under California law announced in Wimberly v. Superior Court,66
a warrantless search of the passenger compartment of a vehicle is
proper, providing officers have probable cause to believe that a vehi-
cle stopped on a highway contains fruits or evidence of a criminal ac-
tivity.67 However, the Wimberly court also held that the existence of
probable cause to search the interior of an automobile does not neces-
arrest. Instead, the court found the search illegal as a matter of law by treating the
arrest as one by a private citizen. 24 Cal. 3d at 364, 594 P.2d at 1004, 155 Cal. Rptr. at
579.
61. 256 U.S. 465 (1921). See supra note 56.
62. 453 U.S. 454 (1981). See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
63. I& at 460.
64. 456 U.S. 798 (1982). Acting on probable cause that defendant was selling her-
oin from his automobile trunk, police officers stopped defendant's car and arrested
him. Upon opening the car trunk, one of the officers found a closed paper bag which
was opened to reveal heroin. The car was then driven to police headquarters where
another warrantless search of the trunk revealed a zippered leather pouch containing
cash. Based on this evidence, defendant was convicted of possession of heroin with in-
tent to distribute. Id at 801.
65. rd, at 825. The Court reasoned that "the scope of the warrantless search ... is
no broader and no narrower than a magistrate could legitimately authorize by war-
rant." Id.
66. 16 Cal. 3d 557, 547 P.2d 417, 128 Cal. Rptr. 641 (1976). The police in this in-
stance pulled the defendant over for erratic driving and, after approaching the car, ob-
served marijuana seeds and a smoking pipe in the front seat. The interior of the car
was searched and a plastic bag containing a small amount of marijuana was found.
The arresting officers then opened the trunk of the car and found several pounds of
marijuana in a suitcase. Id, at 562, 547 P.2d at 420, 128 Cal. Rptr at 644.
67. Id, at 565, 547 P.2d at 422, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 646. Prior California cases requir-
ing evidence of exigent circumstances to accompany the probable cause requirement
have been eroded to the point where sufficient exigency exists whenever probable
cause is first determined to be sufficient at the time the police stop a vehicle and have
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sarily suffice to justify a search of the trunk, absent specific articul-
able facts which give rise to probable cause to believe that
contraband is in fact concealed in the trunk.6 8 The evidence discov-
ered in the passenger compartment was sufficient only to show that
defendant was a casual user of marijuana and did not give rise to a
reasonable belief that further contraband was contained in the
trunk.6 9
In the post-Proposition 8 case of People v. Chavers,70 the California
Supreme Court once again deferred ruling on the amendment's appli-
cability by deciding that the challenged search and seizure were valid
under prior California law from Wimberly without having to resort
to the federal law of United States v. Ross. 71 Using the Wimberly
analysis, the court held that there was sufficient probable cause to
search the interior of the defendant's car, the glove compartment,
and an opaque shaving kit found in the glove compartment.
Although a substantially more extensive search was justified in Cha-
vers, the key determining factor was the existence of specific prob-
able cause in Chavers for searching each area of the car; this specific
probable cause was lacking in Wimberly.
Although the same result was reached in Chavers via the Wim-
berly analysis as would have been achieved by application of the fed-
eral standard enunciated in Ross, the tedious step-by-step analysis
needed to find specific probable cause for each area of search serves
to emphasize by contrast the advantage that would be achieved by
not had a prior opportunity to obtain a warrant. See People v. Chavers, 33 Cal. 3d 462,
467-68, 658 P.2d 96, 99, 189 Cal. Rptr. 169, 172 (1983).
68. 16 Cal. 3d at 568, 547 P.2d at 424, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 648.
69. I& at 572, 547 P.2d at 427, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 651.
70. 33 Cal. 3d 462, 658 P.2d 96, 189 Cal. Rptr. 169 (1983). An arrest of the defend-
ant for robbery and a subsequent search of the automobile glove box and a shaving kit
found therein produced a handgun which was used in the robbery. Following Wim-
berly v. Superior Court the court held that the officer had probable cause to believe
that the automobile contained contraband, and therefore a warrantless search was jus-
tified. Id& at 468, 658 P.2d at 100, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 173. The court next approved the
glove compartment search because the suspects had no identification on them, and be-
cause the glove box is a traditional repository of vehicle registration and possibly other
evidence of identification. The court also noted probable cause to believe a robbery
weapon could be found in the glove box because of its close proximity to the suspects.
Id at 470, 658 P.2d at 101, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 174. Inquiring into the propriety of opening
the opaque shaving kit found in the glove box, the court found that the seizure of the
kit was entirely legitimate, noting that the officer legitimately gained knowledge that
the case contained a gun by inadvertently feeling its outline. This, coupled with the
potential danger posed by the handgun, rendered the warrantless search reasonable.
I& at 471, 658 P.2d at 102, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 175.
71. 456 U.S. 798 (1982). See supra notes 64-65.
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utilization of the less strict federal standard. Under Proposition 8,
the evidence seized in Wimberly as well as Chavers would be admis-
sible. It would not have been necessary to articulate facts showing
the existence of specific probable cause in Cavers; the trunk search
in Wimberly would have yielded admissible evidence even though
facts justifying probable cause specific to the trunk could not have
been articulated.
4. Closed container searches
Current federal law as stated in United States v. Ross72 and United
States v. Johns73 provides that when police have probable cause to
search a vehicle without a warrant for a particular type of evidence
(narcotics, stolen property, etc.), a warrantless search is also permit-
ted of any closed container found in the vehicle during the course of
the search, provided that the container could conceivably hold the ev-
idence sought. The only limitation to this authority is that the search
of the closed container occur as part of an automobile search, with
probable cause for the entire vehicle. Under the rationale of New
York v. Belton, if the search is incident to a custodial arrest, even if
there is no probable cause, not only the interior of an automobile
may be searched, but also any containers found therein.74
Employing a more stringent standard, the California Supreme
Court in People v. Minjares75 held that a closed container found in a
vehicle may not be searched without a warrant if there is a reason-
able expectation of privacy in the container's contents unless real ex-
igencies exist.76 The court rejected the rationale of Ross and Belton
and attempted to analogize the situation to that of United States v.
Chadwick,77 even though the facts are more in line with Ross.
72. 456 U.S. at 823.
73. 105 S. Ct. 881 (1985). The Court in this case reaffirmed the automobile excep-
tion of United States v. Ross.
74. 453 U.S. 454 (1981). See supra note 51.
75. 24 Cal. 3d 410, 591 P.2d 514, 153 Cal. Rptr. 224, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 887 (1979).
After police gave hot pursuit of a robbery getaway car, the defendant was arrested and
the automobile was impounded. A closed, zippered tote bag found in the trunk of the
car was opened by police to reveal clothing described by witnesses to the robbery,
three guns, and a roll of pennies from the store that was robbed. Id. at 415, 591 P.2d at
516, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 226. See also People v. Dalton, 24 Cal. 3d 850, 598 P.2d 467, 157
Cal. Rptr. 497 (1979) (state was required to show probable cause and exigent circum-
stances to justify a warranties search of boxes in the suspect's car).
76. 24 Cal. 3d at 419, 591 P.2d at 518, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 228. The court felt that an
individual's interest in keeping private the contents of personal luggage is not lost sim-
ply because that luggage is placed in an automobile, even though probable cause for
the search was originally focused on the automobile, contrary to the situation in
United States v. Chadwick. Id. at 419, 591 P.2d at 518, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 228.
77. In United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977), federal narcotics agents seized
a footlocker, with ample probable cause to believe that it contained marijuana, after it
had been placed in the trunk of an automobile. After defendants together with the
footlocker were taken to a federal facility, the footlocker was opened one and one-half
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Following Proposition 8, California courts are constrained to follow
the federal standard established in Ross and Belton wherever similar
situations arise. As noted above, this would allow arresting officers
to make warrantless searches of closed containers found in
automobiles incident to a custodial arrest or whenever there is suffi-
cient probable cause to believe the car contains weapons or evidence.
Under this standard, the search declared illegal by Minjares would
now be valid, and the evidence obtained thereby would be admissible.
5. Trash can searches
Although the federal standard for trash can searches has not been
reviewed by the Supreme Court, it appears to be reasonably well set-
tled at the circuit court level. In United States v. Shelby,7 8 the Sev-
enth Circuit Court of Appeals found that there was no reasonable
expectation of privacy79 in garbage cans left for collection, and there-
fore a warrantless search was permissible. In the court's view, "the
placing of trash in the garbage cans at the time and place for antici-
pated collection by public employees for hauling to a public dump sig-
nifies abandonment."8 0
California, on the other hand, has adopted the contrary position.
In People v. Krivda,81 a case with facts almost identical to those of
hours later without a warrant, revealing large quantities of marijuana. In granting de-
fendants' motion to suppress, the Court held that the automobile exception to the
search warrant requirement does not apply where the search is not incident to a law-
ful arrest, and where probable cause did not exist for the automobile, but only for the
container. Id. at 14-16.
The Court also cited the lack of exigency, because the search was conducted over an
hour after the federal agents had gained exclusive control of the footlocker and long
after the defendants had been securely in custody. Id. at 15. The Court concluded that
a closed container search will only be valid without a warrant if it comes within the
purview of the automobile exception of Ross or the search incident to arrest exception
as applied to an automobile in Belton. Id.
78. 573 F.2d 971 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 841 (1978). In this case, the de-
fendant worked as a supervisor for a janitorial company rendering cleaning services to
a number of banks. Upon leaving that employment, he retained keys to the banks
which were subsequently used to steal about $3,000.00 in coins. Rubbish collectors
were asked by the FBI and local police to search the defendant's trash cans upon pick-
up. In doing so, the collectors found aluminum bank trays and coin wrappers, which
were then used as the basis for obtaining a search warrant for the defendant's home.
Id. at 972-73.
79. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
80. 573 F.2d at 973. See also United States v. Crowell, 586 F.2d 1020, 1025 (4th Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 959 (1979); Magda v. Benson, 536 F.2d 111, 112 (6th Cir.
1976); United States v. Mustone, 469 F.2d 970, 972 (1st Cir. 1972).
81. 5 Cal. 3d 357, 486 P.2d 1262, 96 Cal. Rptr. 62 (1971), vacated, 409 U.S. 33 (1972),
affd on rehearing, 8 Cal. 3d 623, 504 P.2d 457, 105 Cal. Rptr. 521 (1973), cert. denied,
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Shelby, 82 the California Supreme Court found that even placing the
trash in the well of the refuse truck did not extinguish the defend-
ant's expectation of privacy, and a warrantless search constituted an
unreasonable governmental intrusion into that privacy. In reaching
this holding, the court stated that "defendants had a reasonable ex-
pectation that their trash would not be rummaged through and
picked over by police officers acting without a search warrant."83
Following Proposition 8, California courts may conceivably ignore
Shelby, as persuasive rather than binding authority, although such a
decision would most likely be subject to subsequent Supreme Court
review. Review is the more likely because, after Proposition 8, in-
dependent state grounds would no longer provide any valid justifica-
tion for a divergent opinion.
6. Telephone records
Federal law currently holds that a person has no legitimate expec-
tation of privacy in information voluntarily turned over to third par-
ties.8 4 Using this rationale, the Supreme Court held in Smith v.
Maryland8 5 that the defendant had no expectation of privacy in a list
compiled by the telephone company of all phone numbers dialed
from his phone. The Court concluded that when the defendant chose
to use his phone, he voluntarily conveyed the numbers he was calling
to the phone company. He therefore assumed the risk that the phone
company might in turn convey that information to the police.8 6
In the California case of People v. Blair,7 the court acknowledged
that there was no factual distinction from the Smith case. Neverthe-
412 U.S. 919 (1973). The case was vacated and remanded because the United States
Supreme Court could not tell if the decision had been made on federal grounds or on
independent state grounds. On remand, the California Supreme Court confirmed that
the decision was rendered solely on state grounds.
82. After receiving an anonymous tip that the defendants were engaged in crimi-
nal activity, the police began observing the defendants' home. When they saw trash
cans by the curb for collection and collectors approaching the cans, the officers asked
the collectors to empty the well of their trash truck before collecting the defendants'
garbage. After examining the contents of the well, the officers discovered paper sacks
containing marijuana debris and seeds. This evidence was used, in large part, to con-
vict the defendants of possession. 5 Cal. 3d at 360, 486 P.2d at 1263-64, 96 Cal. Rptr. at
63-64.
83. Id at 367, 486 P.2d at 1268, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 68.
84. See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442-44 (1976) (no expectation of
privacy in financial information voluntarily conveyed to banks in the ordinary course
of business); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 335-36 (1973) (no expectation of pri-
vacy in financial information voluntarily given to an accountant for purposes of income
tax return preparation).
85. 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
86. Id at 744. See also SEC v. Jerry T. O'Brien, Inc., 104 S. Ct. 2720, 2726 (1984)
(one cannot object if third party who receives information confidentially conveys infor-
mation to law enforcement authorities).
87. 25 Cal. 3d 640, 602 P.2d 738, 159 Cal. Rptr. 818 (1979).
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less, the court concluded that California law did not allow seizure of
such a list without a search warrant.8 8 A person making telephone
calls "has a reasonable expectation that the calls he makes will be
utilized only for the accounting functions of the telephone company
and that he cannot anticipate that his personal life, as disclosed by
the calls he makes and receives, will be disclosed to outsiders without
legal process."8 9 Thus, California decided the issue solely on the ba-
sis of independent state grounds, a justification no longer available
after Proposition 8.
7. Search warrant affidavits
The United States Supreme Court held in Franks v. Delaware9o
that, although perjury or a reckless disregard of truth is shown in a
supporting affidavit, a search warrant may still be valid if the re-
maining content is sufficient to establish probable cause. However,
the California Supreme Court in People v. Cook9l took a stricter posi-
tion by holding that deliberate or reckless affidavit misstatements,
whether material or not, compel the quashing of the search warrant
as a matter of state law. In the case of negligent misstatements, Cali-
fornia will still uphold the warrant if it would otherwise be valid ab-
sent the incorrect information. 92 The court reaffirmed the holding of
Cook in People v. Kurland,93 indicating that any material fact omitted
88. I& at 654, 602 P.2d at 737, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 827. The only difference of any
possible substance was that, in People v. Blair, the calls were made from a California
hotel phone and the list was compiled by the hotel. See infra note 132 for the disposi-
tion of records obtained from a Pennsylvania hotel.
89. Id. at 653, 602 P.2d at 746, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 826.
90. 438 U.S. 154 (1978). In Franks v. Delaware, the defendant was charged with
rape based upon evidence obtained after a search warrant had been issued. The de-
fendant challenged the truthfulness of certain statements in the affidavits supporting
the warrant as being intentional misstatements. The Court held that the defendant
would be allowed to present evidence at a hearing to show that the statements were
intentionally false or made with reckless disregard for the truth. However, the Court
stated that even if the defendant were to show that the false statements were inten-
tionally made, he would also have to show that the remaining portions of the affidavits
were insufficient to establish probable cause for a search warrant. I. at 155-56.
91. 22 Cal. 3d 67, 583 P.2d 130, 148 Cal. Rptr. 605 (1978). Defendant Cook was
prosecuted for possession of marijuana and other drugs after a magistrate had issued a
warrant for a search of defendant's residence. The court upheld his motion to sup-
press due to the fact that the affidavit of the investigating officer contained intentional
misstatements. Id. at 86-87, 583 P.2d at 141, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 616.
92. See Theodor v. Superior Court, 8 Cal. 3d 77, 100-01, 501 P.2d 234, 251, 104 Cal.
Rptr. 226, 243 (1972).
93. 28 Cal. 3d 376, 390, 618 P.2d 213, 221-22, 168 Cal. Rptr. 667, 676 (1980), cert. de-
nied, 451 U.S. 987 (1981).
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from an affidavit for the purpose of misleading a magistrate justifies
a striking of the entire warrant, regardless of the sufficiency of the
remaining warrant.
Proposition 8 makes the federal Franks approach, rejected in Cook
and Kurland, the California standard. Proposition 8's impact will ar-
guably be felt in decreased incidence of quashed search warrants and
of products of such searches, thereby giving prosecutors more evi-
dence on which to build their cases.
8. Warrant information from informants
The recent Supreme Court decision in Illinois v. Gates94 clarified
the federal standard for issuing a search warrant based on informa-
tion received from an informer. Under the new standard, a magis-
trate is authorized to make a pre-trial "common-sense"
determination of whether the informant's information provides suffi-
cient probable cause. In making this determination, the magistrate
need only take into account the "totality of the circumstances." 95
This new approach has yet to be widely accepted by California
courts, many of which continue to adhere to the former federal Agui-
lar-Spinelli test.96 The Aguilar-Spinelli approach uses a two-prong
test which requires that all informers whose information is involved
in the issuance of a search warrant be shown to be not only reliable
or credible, but also capable of knowing the truth of that which they
perceive.
Proposition 8 mandates the acceptance of the federal "totality of
the circumstances" test of Gates by California. This test appears to
be more flexible in terms of allowing an affiant to establish probable
94. 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
95. Id. The "totality of the circumstances" providing probable cause for issuance
of a search warrant in Gates consisted of the police department's receipt of an anony-
mous letter which included statements that the defendants, husband and wife, were
engaged in selling drugs; that the wife would drive their car to Florida on May 3rd to
be loaded with drugs; that the husband would fly down in a few days to drive the car
back; that the trunk of the car would be loaded with drugs; and that over $100,000.00
worth of drugs were presently in defendants' basement. Relying on this tip, a police
officer determined defendants' address and confirmed the husband's May 5th flight
reservation to Florida. Subsequent surveillance by the Drug Enforcement Administra-
tion corroborated the husband's flight to Florida and return trip by car to Illinois.
Based on the anonymous letter and subsequent corroboration, a search warrant was
issued by a state judge. I& at 225-26.
96. This test was derived from a combination of the cases of Aguilar v. Texas, 378
U.S. 108 (1964), and Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969). The test was used by
the Illinois Supreme Court in People v. Gates, 85 Ill. 2d 376, 423 N.E.2d 887 (1982),
rev'd, 462 U.S. 213 (1983), to hold that the issuance of the search warrant was invalid.
The Court felt that the anonymous letter and supporting affidavits failed to satisfy the
two-pronged test because they did not (1) reveal the informant's "basis of knowledge"
or (2) provide facts sufficient to establish either the informant's "veracity" or the "reli-
ability" of the report. 462 U.S. at 227-28.
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cause for a search warrant than does the more rigid Aguilar-Spinelli
two-prong test which many California courts still employ.97
9. Standing to challenge illegal searches
In Alderman v. United States,98 the Supreme Court restricted the
right of an accused to exclude evidence obtained during the illegal
search by limiting standing to seek suppression of the evidence to
only those persons whose fourth amendment rights were immedi-
ately violated.99 The Court adhered to the general rule that "Fourth
Amendment rights are personal rights which... may not be vicari-
ously asserted,"10 0 reasoning that "[t]here is no necessity to exclude
evidence against one defendant in order to protect the rights of
another."O1
By contrast, the California Supreme Court established a so-called
vicarious exclusionary rule which provides for an extension of the
availability of standing to any party potentially aggrieved. This ex-
pansion allows a party whose rights have not been immediately vio-
lated to seek suppression of allegedly illegally obtained evidence if
that evidence could potentially lead to his conviction.102
97. For recent examples of the use of the Aguilar-Spinelli test by California
courts, see People v. Mason, 132 Cal. App. 3d 594, 183 Cal. Rptr. 246 (1982) (affidavit
passed the first prong, but failed the second prong because the affidavit supporting the
search warrant failed to set forth facts on which the magistrate could rationally be-
lieve that the confidential informant was credible or reliable); People v. Reagan, 128
Cal. App. 3d 92, 180 Cal. Rptr. 85 (1982) (an anonymous phone call to a police officer's
secretary about a motorcycle robbery failed to pass the first prong because the support-
ing affidavit for the search warrant did not establish that the anonymous informant
spoke with personal knowledge, but merely created an inference that the speaker was
relating information he had heard from others).
98. 394 U.S. 165 (1969).
99. See also Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978). In this case, an automobile was
stopped and searched after the police received a radioed robbery report. A sawed-off
rifle was found under the seat and rifle shells were found in the glove box. The Court
held that the passengers had no legitimate expectation of privacy, since they had no
interest in the automobile or the items recovered in the search, and denied standing to
challenge the search. Id at 148-49.
100. Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. at 174.
101. Id.
102. See People v. Martin, 45 Cal. 2d 755, 761, 290 P.2d 855, 857 (1955). In that case,
the California Supreme Court determined that a defendant has standing to object to
the use of evidence, not because of a violation of his own constitutional rights, but be-
cause the government must not be allowed to profit from its own wrong, thus encour-
aging lawless enforcement of the law. See also Kaplan v. Superior Court, 6 Cal. 3d 150,
491 P.2d 1, 98 Cal. Rptr. 649 (1971). In Kaplan, police stopped a car for speeding and
engaged in an illegal pat-down search which revealed LSD in the driver's shirt pocket.
The driver was given immunity in exchange for his testimony that he bought the LSD
from his passenger. Id. at 161, 491 P.2d at 2, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 651. Following Martin,
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California law has now been substantially revised in this area as a
result of Proposition 8. The California Supreme Court has, for the
first time, in the case of In re Lance W.,103 unequivocally recognized
that the doctrine of independent state grounds as it relates to the ad-
missibility of evidence in a criminal trial is no longer valid. In the
Lance W. case, the defendant moved to suppress marijuana illegally
seized from a third party's pick-up truck. After determining that
California's broader standing rule could not be used, the court went
on to apply the Alderman standard and refused to extend standing to
contest the search. Since the Lance W. case is a seminal case in post-
Proposition 8 California law, it will be examined in some detail in
Part V of this comment.10 4
10. Use of illegal statements for impeachment purposes
In the landmark case of Miranda v. Arizona,10 5 the Supreme Court
established a set of rules governing custodial interrogation by police
officers. Prior to custodial interrogation, the suspect must be clearly
apprised of certain constitutional rights.1 06 Unless these warnings
are given and waiver obtained from the suspect, any statement re-
sulting from further interrogation is inadmissible as substantive evi-
dence in the prosecution's case in chief.1 07 The Supreme Court held
in a subsequent case, Harris v. New York,1os that a statement ob-
tained in violation of Miranda which would be otherwise inadmissi-
ble could be used for the limited purpose of impeaching the
credibility of a defendant. Reasoning that the safeguards granted in
the court held that the defendant had standing to exclude the illegally obtained evi-
dence. Id. at 161, 491 P.2d at 8, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 657.
103. 37 Cal. 3d 873, 694 P.2d 744, 210 Cal. Rptr. 631 (1985).
104. See infra notes 178-219 and accompanying text.
105. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
106. The substantial content of the following rights must be stated to the suspect:
(1) You have the right to remain silent.
(2) If you choose not to remain silent, anything you say or write can and will be
used against you in a court of law.
(3) You have a right to consult a lawyer before any questioning, and you have a
right to have the lawyer present with you during any questioning.
(4) You not only have a right to consult with a lawyer before any questioning, but if
you lack the financial ability to retain a lawyer, one will be appointed to represent you
before any questioning, and you may have the appointed lawyer present with you dur-
ing any questioning.
(5) If you choose not to remain silent and do not wish to consult with a lawyer or
have a lawyer present, you still have the right to remain silent and the right to consult
with a lawyer at any time during the questioning. Id. at 467-73.
107. Id. at 479.
108. 401 U.S. 222 (1971). In Harris v. New York, the defendant was found guilty of
selling narcotics. Defendant's trial testimony was impeached by a statement which
was inadmissible in the prosecution's case in chief because defendant had not been
given Miranda warnings, but which otherwise satisfied legal standards of trustworthi-
ness. Id. at 224.
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Miranda should not become a license for perjury,109 the Court con-
cluded that the deterrent function of Miranda would be adequately
preserved by forbidding the prosecution's use of the tainted evidence
in its case in chief.110
In sharp contrast to the boundaries of the Miranda exclusionary
rule set by the United States Supreme Court in Harris, the Califor-
nia Supreme Court held in People v. Disbrowl that statements vio-
lating Miranda are inadmissible for any purpose, including
impeachment. The court emphasized the doctrine of independent
state grounds by stating that "[w]e pause finally to reaffirm the in-
dependent nature of the California Constitution and our responsibil-
ity to separately define and protect the rights of California citizens
despite conflicting decisions of the United States Supreme Court in-
terpreting the federal Constitution. ' 112 The court went on to hold
that the privilege against self-incrimination precludes use by the
prosecution of any statement made by the defendant which was ob-
tained as the result of a Miranda violation, whether used for affirma-
tive evidence or for impeachment.11s
Proposition 8 as applied in this area requires the federal precedent
of Harris v. New York to be applied in California, as well as any
other exception to the Miranda rule established by the Supreme
Court.1 1 4 Thus, post-Proposition 8 California law must allow for im-
peachment of defendants with otherwise inadmissible statements.
11. Right to counsel at lineups
The Supreme Court has held that the federal constitutional right
to counsel attaches to all post-indictment lineups.115 Therefore, any
identification at a post-indictment lineup where counsel is not pres-
ent and the right to counsel has not been waived will be inadmissible
109. Id. at 225-26.
110. Id. at 225. For additional exceptions to the Miranda rule, see New York v.
Quarles, 104 S. Ct. 2626 (1984) (public safety exception); Nix v. Williams, 104 S. Ct.
2501 (1984) (inevitable discovery and independent source exceptions).
111. 16 Cal. 3d 101, 545 P.2d 272, 127 Cal. Rptr. 360 (1976).
112. Id. at 114-15, 545 P.2d at 280, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 368.
113. Id. at 113, 545 P.2d at 280, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 368.
114. See supra note 110.
115. See Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967) (testimony at trial regarding un-
counseled post-indictment lineup excluded, absent an opportunity to show an in-
dependent source of the in-court identification); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218
(1967) (conviction reversed where the defendant had been indicted and later identified
in a lineup of which his counsel neither had been notified nor had an opportunity to
attend).
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at trial. The rationale is that a post-indictment lineup is a critical
stage in the criminal process for which sixth amendment protections
are available.116
However, the Court in Kirby v. Illinois117 declined to extend the
right to those cases involving lineups occurring before "the initiation
of adversary judicial proceedings-whether by way of formal charge,
preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment," be-
cause a critical stage in the criminal prosecution to which the sixth
amendment will apply has not yet been reached.'18
Under its doctrine of independent state grounds, the California
Supreme Court recently required in People v. Bustamante"19 that
counsel be in attendance at pre-indictment lineups. Although not
specifically indicating that the pre-indictment lineup is a "critical
stage of the prosecution,"120 the court rejected the Kirby limitation
as "wholly unrealistic."'121 Proposition 8 requires application of the
Kirby rule in California, and only the Kirby rule. As a consequence,
defendants no longer will be able to use the argument of a denial of
the right to counsel to exclude identifications obtained in pre-indict-
ment lineups.
12. Good faith exceptions to the exclusionary rule
In Michigan v. DeFillippo,122 the Supreme Court permitted a lim-
ited good faith exception to the exclusionary rule for evidence ob-
tained during an arrest based on a statutory violation when that
statute was subsequently held unconstitutional at trial. The search
involved here was held to be reasonable in light of the officer's good
faith reliance on the statute. Since the rationale behind the exclu-
sionary rule is to deter future police misconduct, that purpose could
not be served in this instance because the police did not act in bad
faith.123
An opposite conclusion was reached on this issue by a California
appellate court in Jennings v. Superior Court,124 where evidence
116. Gilbert, 388 U.S. at 272-73; Wade, 388 U.S. at 224, 237.
117. 406 U.S. 682 (1972).
118. Id. at 689.
119. 30 Cal. 3d 88, 102, 634 P.2d 927, 935-36, 177 Cal. Rptr. 576, 585 (1981).
120. Wade, 388 U.S. at 237.
121. 30 Cal. 3d at 100, 634 P.2d at 935, 177 Cal. Rptr. at 584.
122. 443 U.S. 31 (1979). Here the officer who arrested defendants had abundant
probable cause to believe that defendants' conduct violated a presumptively valid city
ordinance. Therefore, the arrest of defendants and seizure of drugs found during a
search of the defendants were held to be lawful despite the fact that the city ordinance
was later declared unconstitutional. Id at 40.
123. See id. at 38 n.3. See also Ball, Good Faith and the Fourth Amendment; The
"Reasonable" Exception to the Exclusionary Rule, 69 J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 635
passim (1978).
124. 104 Cal. App. 3d 50, 163 Cal. Rptr. 391 (1980). In Jennings, the court invali-
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seized incident to an arrest was suppressed when the reviewing court
invalidated the ordinance on which the arrest was based. On a
closely related issue in People v. Ramirez,125 the California Supreme
Court held that no limited good faith exception is available when po-
lice act pursuant to an outdated warrant. In this instance, the de-
fendant's arrest resulted from a radioed warrant check of the police
computer system that improperly revealed an outdated bench war-
rant. The court invalidated the arrest and excluded the evidence
seized as a consequence.126 ,
In the federal arena, the boundaries of the exclusionary rule have
been substantially contracted in the years since DeFillippo. In 1976,
the Supreme Court indicated that the rationale of the so-called "im-
perative of judicial integrity" as an independent basis for suppressing
evidence obtained as a result of police misconduct should seldom be
used.127 As a result, the nearly exclusive purpose of the federal ex-
clusionary rule in this area has become deterrence.
With this in mind, the Supreme Court has recently recognized
much broader "good faith" exceptions to the exclusionary rule than
those provided in DeFillippo. In United States v. Leon,128 the Court
concluded that, as long as the police officers acted in good faith in ob-
taining a search warrant, the fact that the magistrate issuing the war-
rant was mistaken as to the sufficiency of probable cause will not
dated a seizure of heroin found in the back seat of a police car used to transport de-
fendant to jail following her arrest under a municipal vagrancy ordinance. The
ordinance was later construed to require an element of maliciousness by a person who
obstructs a public place; the maliciousness was not shown in this case. See id. at 52-58,
163 Cal. Rptr. at 392-96.
125. 34 Cal. 3d 541, 668 P.2d 761, 194 Cal. Rptr. 454 (1983). Although this was a
post-Proposition 8 case, Justice Bird's concurring opinion noted that the application of
Proposition 8 was not necessary to the determination of the case, since the arrest was
made long before the effective date of the initiative. Id at 552, 668 P.2d at 768-69, 194
Cal. Rptr. at 462 (Bird, C.J., concurring).
126. The court indicated that, while the arresting officers no doubt acted in good
faith reliance on the information provided to them through "official channels," law en-
forcement officials are collaterally responsible for keeping those channels free of out-
dated, incomplete, or inaccurate warrant information. Id at 552, 668 P.2d at 768, 194
Cal. Rptr. at 461.
127. United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976).
The primary meaning of "judicial integrity" in the context of evidentiary
rules is that the courts must not commit or encourage violations of the Consti-
tution .... The focus therefore must be on the question whether the admis-
sion of the evidence encourages violations of Fourth Amendment rights....
(Tihis inquiry is essentially the same as the inquiry into whether exclusion
would serve a deterrent purpose.
Id at 458-59 n.35.
128. 104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984).
1083
result in exclusion of evidence resulting from the search.129 Simi-
larly, in the companion case of Massachusetts v. Sheppard,130 the
Court held that where police officers acted in objectively reasonable
reliance on a warrant issued by a detached and neutral magistrate,
and had been assured of the validity of the warrant by the magis-
trate, the exclusionary rule would not be applied, notwithstanding
the fact that the warrant was subsequently determined to be invalid.
Although the California Supreme Court has never excluded evi-
dence solely for the purpose of preserving "judicial integrity,"''1 it
has, in the face of increasing criticism, reasserted the doctrine as an
alternative basis for the exclusionary rule.132 With this "judicial in-
tegrity" doctrine still in force, the California Supreme Court had a
129. Id at 3421. The rationale was that, since the purpose of the exclusionary rule
was to deter misconduct, and since the application here could not affect conduct of the
police, exclusion would not serve the purpose. Id at 3420. The Court stated that "the
exclusionary rule is designed to deter police misconduct rather than to punish the er-
rors of judges and magistrates," id& at 3418 (emphasis added), and to have any deter-
rent effect "it must alter the behavior of individual law enforcement officers or the
policies of their departments." Id. at 3419.
130. 104 S. Ct. 3424 (1984). In this case, there was sufficient probable cause and the
police acted properly throughout the investigation. The problem arose because the
proper warrant form could not be found. To request authority to search, the officer
used a form normally used to search for controlled substances to apply for authoriza-
tion to search for evidence of a homicide. The judge made some changes on the form
but did not change the substantive portion which continued to authorize a search for
controlled substances. He then signed the warrant and returned it with assurances
that it was sufficient authority in form and content to authorize the search requested.
The Court concluded that the police acted in reasonable reliance upon the assurances
of the judge and that application of the exclusionary rule would therefore not serve its
intended purpose. Id. at 3429-30.
131. In discussing judicial integrity, the California Supreme Court stated that the
"'success of the lawless venture depends entirely on the court's lending its aid by al-
lowing the evidence to be introduced .... Out of regard for its own dignity as an
agency of justice and custodian of liberty, the court should not have a hand in such
"dirty business."' " People v. Blair, 25 Cal. 3d 640, 656, 602 P.2d 738, 748, 159 Cal. Rptr.
818, 828 (1979) (quoting People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 445, 282 P.2d 905, 912 (1955)).
132. See People v. Blair, 25 Cal. 3d 640, 655, 602 P.2d 738, 748, 159 Cal. Rptr. 818, 828
(1979). In this case, the defendant was convicted of murder based partially on evidence
obtained as the result of a seizure of telephone records: records of calls made by the
defendant from a hotel room in California; and records of calls made by an associate of
the defendant in Pennsylvania. Id at 647-48, 602 P.2d at 742-43, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 822-
23. Defendant objected to the use of these records because the method by which they
were obtained violated California law.
The court finally held that, although the seizure of the records was illegal under
California law, the purposes of the exclusionary rule would not be served by sup-
pressing the records as evidence because the records were seized by federal agents in
Pennsylvania and the method of seizure was entirely legal under Pennsylvania and
federal law. The Blair court reiterated that from its inception there has been a dual
purpose for the exclusionary rule: (1) to deter police from engaging in unconstitutional
searches and seizures by eliminating the incentive to do so; and (2) to relieve the
courts from being compelled to participate in illegal conduct. Id. at 655, 602 P.2d at
748, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 828.
The court concluded that the first goal of the exclusionary rule would not be served
through exclusion of the evidence. Because no California law enforcement personnel
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theoretical basis for rejecting any future reformation of the federal
exclusionary rule.
As long as independent state grounds were available to the Califor-
nia courts, it was unlikely that California would ever adopt a good
faith exception to the exclusionary rule. Even absent deterrent ef-
fect, such an exception would likely have been disapproved solely on
the basis of the desire to preserve judicial integrity.
Proposition 8 impact in this area is obvious. First, it requires appli-
cation of the DeFillippo holding to situations where a statute is later
found to be invalid. This results in overruling Jennings and probably
Ramirez. Second, any good faith exception recognized by the United
States Supreme Court, such as those of the Leon and Sheppard cases,
is now mandated in California. Independent state grounds may not
be used to justify a reassertion of the doctrine of judicial integrity as
a basis for expanding the scope of the exclusionary rule.
B. Prior Conviction Cases
The California standard for impeachment with prior felony convic-
tions was established in People v. Beagle133 in 1972. In this case, the
defendant was charged with arson and attempted arson. At the trial
the prosecution attempted to introduce evidence of the defendant's
prior felony conviction for issuing a check without sufficient funds
for purposes of attacking the credibility of the defendant's testimony.
The trial court admitted the evidence and the defendant was
convicted.
In a unanimous decision, the California Supreme Court upheld the
conviction. First, the court examined the two relevant provisions of
the Evidence Code34 and determined that, taken together, they
clearly gave discretion to the trial judge to exclude evidence of prior
participated in the search of the records, and because the seizure was not illegal in
Philadelphia, there could be no deterrent effect on police from either jurisdiction. I&
In addressing the goal of judicial integrity, the court concluded that because defend-
ant's expectation of'privacy was not violated in the state where he resided, the venture
was not lawless and thus, in this instance, the government would not be acting as a
lawbreaker. Although the court eventually decided not to suppress the Pennsylvania
records, they did so only after considering both aspects of the exclusionary rule. This
illustrates that the doctrine of judicial integrity may be subject to reassertion at any
time by the California courts, and could be used as the basis for application of the ex-
clusionary rule regardless of the lack of any potential deterrent effect. But see supra
notes 87-89 and accompanying text for disposition of the California records.
133. 6 Cal. 3d 441, 492 P.2d 1, 99 Cal. Rptr. 313 (1972).
134. The two relevant provisions are CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 352 and 788 (West 1966).
See supra notes 37 and 38 for the text of these statutes.
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felony convictions "when their probative value on credibility is out-
weighed by the risk of undue prejudice."1s 5
The court then considered the factors that should be taken into ac-
count in applying this balancing test. 3 6 First, since the purpose is
only to attack the witness' credibility, the prior crime should involve
conduct which reflects on the witness' honesty and integrity. Gener-
ally, those convictions involving violent or assaultive conduct have
little or no bearing on honesty and thus would have little relevance
for impeachment purposes. 3 7 In Beagle, since "[a]n essential ele-
ment of the crime of issuing a check without sufficient funds is intent
to defraud,"138 the conviction had substantial relevance to the issue
of the defendant's credibility.
Second, the prior crime should not be too remote in time. Even if
the crime involves dishonesty, if it occurred a long time ago with no
other crimes following, it is probably not very probative of the wit-
ness' credibility at the time of his testimony. No definite standard is
set; as with the other factors, it is left to the discretion of the trial
judge. In this case, the prior crime was committed less than five
years before the time of testimony and was therefore held to be
probative. 3 9
The final major factor for consideration is whether or not the prior
crime was the same as or similar to the one for which the defendant
is currently being tried. The court reasoned that, if the crime were
the same, jurors would inevitably tend to find present guilt because
the defendant committed the crime before. Admission of such evi-
dence would therefore be extremely prejudicial. In the Beagle case,
the court determined that the prior crime presented no close analogy
to the current charges and concluded that "the probative value of
this prior felony conviction was substantially high and the risk of un-
due prejudice was minimized."'140
The Beagle test was again relied upon in People v. Fries. 141 An at-
tempt was made to impeach the defendant with evidence of a prior
crime that was identical to that for which the defendant was cur-
rently on trial.142 The court held that, although the crime might be
135. 6 Cal. 3d at 453, 492 P.2d at 8, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 320.
136. The court took its analysis from Gordon v. United States, 383 F.2d 936, 940-41
(D.C. Cir. 1967), an opinion written by Chief Justice Warren Burger when he was still
a circuit judge. 6 Cal. 3d at 453, 492 P.2d at 8, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 320.
137. See also People v. Rollo, 20 Cal. 3d 109, 118, 569 P.2d 771, 775, 141 Cal. Rptr.
177, 181 (1977). But cf. People v. Harrison, 150 Cal, App. 3d 1143, 198 Cal. Rptr. 762
(1984) (hearing granted).
138. People v. Beagle, 6 Cal. 3d at 454, 492 P.2d at 9, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 321.
139. Id
140. Id.
141. 24 Cal. 3d 222, 594 P.2d 19, 155 Cal. Rptr. 194 (1979).
142. The crime involved was second degree robbery.
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somewhat probative of the defendant's credibility, the fact that the
crime was identical created a substantial risk of undue prejudice.143
The same rationale was used to exclude the evidence in People v.
Spearman.144 Not only was the prior crime in Spearman identical,
thereby creating a risk of undue prejudice, but it was also not a crime
involving dishonesty, and was therefore irrelevant to a determination
of credibiity.145
In People v. Woodard 146 in 1979, the California Supreme Court ex-
tended the application of section 352 of the Evidence Code to wit-
nesses who are not defendants, noting that section 788 of the
Evidence Code refers only to witnesses generally, without specifying
whether or not the witness is the defendant.147 The court took issue
with the prosecution's argument that a prior crime of the witness
could not prejudice the defendant, stating that the mere fact that the
witness may be less believable or that he may not be put on the stand
due to the possibility of prejudice could be unfair to the defendant.148
Applying the Beagle balancing test, the court held that the prior con-
victions were not probative of the credibility of the witness, were un-
fairly prejudicial to the defendant, and therefore should have been
excluded.149
In 1982, three cases were decided at the appellate level involving
similar factual situations and utilizing essentially the same analysis.
People v. Williams5O involved two defendants convicted of burglary.
143. 24 Cal. 3d at 230, 594 P.2d at 25, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 200.
144. 25 Cal. 3d 107, 599 P.2d 74, 157 Cal. Rptr. 883 (1979).
145. The defendant was charged with possession of heroin for sale and transporting
heroin. At the trial, the prosecution attempted to impeach with evidence of a prior
conviction of possession of heroin for sale. I& at 116, 599 P.2d at 78, 157 Cal. Rptr. at
887.
146. 23 Cal. 3d 329, 590 P.2d 391, 152 Cal. Rptr. 536 (1979). In this case, the defend-
ant was charged with second degree robbery. At trial, a witness to the robbery testi-
fied that the defendant was not the perpetrator. The prosecution used prior
convictions for voluntary manslaughter and possession of a concealable firearm by a
felon to impeach the witness' testimony. Without even reaching the balancing test of
Beagle, the trial judge refused to exclude the evidence.
147. Id. at 337, 590 P.2d at 396, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 541.
148. Where the resolution of a critical issue depends on whose testimony is to
be believed, a jury may act arbitrarily and give little weight to the testimony
of a witness whose character has been brought into question by the introduc-
tion of prior felony convictions.
In addition, the possibility of prejudice may influence a party so that a wit-
ness, who might otherwise present relevant evidence, is not called.
Id at 338, 590 P.2d at 396, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 541.
149. Id at 340, 590 P.2d at 397, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 542.
150. 128 Cal. App. 3d 981, 180 Cal. Rptr. 734 (1982).
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Although one defendant did not testify, the trial court ruled that, if
he chose to testify, he could be impeached with his 1976 robbery con-
viction. On appeal, the court, relying on Beagle for the factors to be
considered and Fries for the proposition that a prior robbery has
some relevance to credibility, upheld the decision of the trial court.15 '
The case of People v. Logan15 2 involved a conviction for armed rob-
bery. After the trial court denied the defendant's motion for exclu-
sion of evidence of a prior conviction for the same crime, the
defendant chose not to testify. On appeal, the court held that,
although the trial court's ruling erroneously prevented the defendant
from testifying, that error was not prejudicial because it was not rea-
sonably probable that a different result would have been reached in
the absence of error.15 3
In the case of People v. Bishop,154 the defendant was convicted of
rape. His attempt to suppress the evidence of a prior burglary was
denied by the trial court. On appeal, the defendant claimed that the
prosecution failed to meet its burden of proving that burglary in-
volved a dishonest act. The appellate court upheld the conviction on
the ground that the burden is on the defendant to prove that his
prior conviction of burglary did not involve a dishonest act. 155 The
court stated further that the trial judge had adequately balanced the
potential prejudice to the defendant against the probative value of his
prior conviction, citing the fact that the court had determined that a
prior robbery was not admissible because it was overly prejudicial.15 6
One case involving these issues reached the California Supreme
Court in 1982. This case, People v. Barrick,57 further limited the use
of prior convictions for impeachment purposes. Although Proposi-
tion 8 had been passed at the time the appeal was heard, the original
trial had occurred prior to the passage date. Therefore, the court re-
151. The court of appeal accurately and concisely summarized the Beagle holding as
follows:
In deciding whether to admit a prior [conviction], the trial court must first
determine its probative value by assessing both the relevance of the prior to
honesty and veracity, and its remoteness. When weighing these factors
against the possible prejudice, the court must consider the similarity of the of-
fense to the crime charged, and the adverse effect on the administration of
justice should the defendant elect not to testify for fear of impeachment.
128 Cal. App. 3d at 988-89, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 739.
152. 131 Cal. App. 3d 575, 182 Cal. Rptr. 543 (1982).
153. Id, at 578, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 544. The missing cash was found in the defendant's
car immediately after the robbery. The defendant confessed, and the defendant was
identified at trial by the person he robbed. Under these circumstances it is unlikely
that a different result would have ensued had the defendant testified.
154. 132 Cal. App. 3d 717, 183 Cal. Rptr. 414 (1982).
155. Id at 721, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 416.
156. Id, at 722, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 417.
157. 33 Cal. 3d 115, 654 P.2d 1243, 187 Cal. Rptr. 716 (1982).
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fused to apply the initiative.15 8
Barrick involved the question of whether a "sanitized" reference to
a prior crime would be admissible for impeachment purposes.15 9 The
trial court ruled such reference admissible, and the defendant there-
fore chose not to testify. The appellate court sustained the convic-
tion, finding this to be an acceptable method of introducing the prior
conviction without prejudicing the defendant.160 The California
Supreme Court reversed the conviction, on the ground that the
method might involve even more prejudice since "the jury would as-
sume that the undisclosed prior offense was indeed identical to the
crime charged."161
As discussed earlier in this comment,1 62 Proposition 8's addition of
section 28(f) to article I of the California Constitution appears to di-
rectly conflict with and overrule the entire line of prior convictions
cases discussed here. These cases were decided under section 352 of
the California Evidence Code, which imposes limits stricter than
those of the federal rules. The constitutional amendment mandates
admission of prior felony convictions for impeachment "without limi-
tation,"163 thus appearing to eliminate any exclusion of prior felony
convictions for impeachment purposes.
V. CALIFORNIA LAw AFTER PROPOSITION 8
A. Challenges to Proposition 8
As expected, a number of challenges have been made against the
implementation of Proposition 8. These challenges attacked the con-
stitutionality of the initiative as a whole rather than the validity of
158. Id at 120 n.1, 654 P.2d at 1245 n.1, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 718 n.1.
Our analysis in this case does not consider the impact of [article I, section
28(f)] on the law regarding the use of prior felony convictions .... [R]ather
than rushing to resolve speculative questions not now before us, the orderly
development of the law will be better served by leaving to future cases ques-
tions regarding the validity and impact of particular sections of Proposition 8.
These difficult issues should be considered in cases where the trial courts and
Courts of Appeal have had an opportunity to consider the issues and add their
insights, and where the issues have been orally argued before this court.
Id.
159. In People v. Barrick, the defendant was on trial for automobile theft. The trial
court ruled that reference to the defendant's prior conviction for automobile theft
could be "sanitized" by referring to it as a "felony involving theft" without actually
naming the crime. Md at 126-28, 654 P.2d at 1249-51, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 722-24.
160. 124 Cal. App. 3d 767, 177 Cal. Rptr. 522.
161. 33 Cal. 3d at 127, 654 P.2d at 1250, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 723.
162. See supra notes 36-47 and accompanying text.
163. See supra note 36 for the full text of the amendment.
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specific individual provisions. Following is a limited review of the
more significant challenges.
1. Violation of the single subject rule.
In Brosnahan v. Brown,164 the California Supreme Court rejected
several challenges to the general constitutionality of Proposition 8
that focused on alleged violations of the single subject rule.1 65 The
single subject rule, as embodied in the California Constitution, pro-
vides that "an initiative measure embracing more than one subject
may not be submitted to the electors or have effect."166 The purposes
of this rule were enunciated in Amador Valley Joint Union High
School District v. State Board of Equalization.167 In that case, the
court stated that the two purposes were to: 1) minimize the risk of
voter confusion and deception; and 2) avoid exploitation of the initia-
tive process by combining in a single measure several provisions
which might not have commanded majority support if considered
separately.168
Interpreting the prior body of case law on the single subject
rule,169 the court reasoned that "'an initiative measure does not vio-
164. 32 Cal. 3d 236, 651 P.2d 274, 186 Cal. Rptr. 30 (1982).
165. Id. In Brosnahan v. Brown, three taxpayers and voters sought writs of man-
date or prohibition asserting various constitutional defects in the manner in which
Proposition 8 was submitted to the voters. The California Supreme Court found that:
1) the proposition did not violate the single subject rule; 2) the proposition did not vio-
late article IV, section 9 of the constitution, which provides that a section of a statute
may not be amended unless the section is reenacted as amended; 3) the proposition did
not on its face constitute an undue impediment of essential government functions; and
4) the change effected by the proposition was not so extensive as to change directly the
substantial entirety of the constitution by deletion or alteration of numerous existing
provisions, thereby necessitating a constitutional convention. Id.
166. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8(d).
167. 22 Cal. 3d 208, 583 P.2d 1281, 149 Cal. Rptr. 239 (1978). This case involved an
earlier similar challenge to Proposition 13, also known as the Jarvis-Gann initiative.
168. Id at 231-32, 583 P.2d at 1291, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 249 (citing Schmitz v. Younger,
21 Cal. 3d 90, 97, 577 P.2d 652, 656, 145 Cal. Rptr. 517, 521 (1978) (Manuel, J., dissent-
ing) and McFadden v. Jordan, 32 Cal. 2d 330, 196 P.2d 787 (1948), cert denied, 336 U.S.
918 (1949)). See also Argument in Favor of Prop. 10, Cal. Voter's Pamphlet, General
Election, Nov. 2, 1948.
169. The court in Amador Valley cited the case of Perry v. Jordan, 34 Cal. 2d 87,
207 P.2d 47 (1949), for its interpretation of the single subject initiative rule. The Perry
case dealt with an initiative to repeal an article of the California Constitution relating
to aid for the aged and blind. The California Supreme Court, in upholding the pro-
posed constitutional amendment, indicated:
"Numerous provisions, having one general objec if fairly indicated in the
title, may be united in one act Provisions governing projects so related and
interdependent as to constitute a single scheme may be properly included
within a single act. . . . The legislature may insert in a single act all legisla-
tion germane to the general subject as expressed in its title and within the
field of legislation suggested thereby.. . . Provisions which are logically ger-
mane to the title of the act and are included within its scope may be united.
The general purpose of a statute being declared, the details provided for its ac-
complishment will be regarded as necessary incidents .... A provision
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late the . . . requirement if, despite its varied collateral effects, all of
its parts are "reasonably germane" to each other,' and to the general
purpose or object of the initiative."170 By adopting this reasoning, the
court rejected an argument that the various provisions of an initiative
must be "interdependent." While Proposition 8's provisions might
not be interdependent, the court held that they were reasonably ger-
mane to each other because they were related to the same general
object-the effective prosecution of criminals.171 The court therefore
concluded that Proposition 8 did not violate the single subject re-
quirement of the California Constitution.
2. Retroactive effect
In response to a challenge regarding the retroactive effect of Prop-
osition 8, the California Supreme Court held in People v. Smith1 72
that the initiative would be applied only to crimes committed after
June 9, 1982, the effective date of Proposition 8. In Smith, the trial
which conduces to the act or which is auxiliary to and promotive of its main
purpose, or has a necessary and natural connection with such purpose, is ger-
mane within the rule."
34 Cal. 2d at 92-93, 207 P.2d at 50 (quoting Evans v. Superior Court, 215 Cal. 58, 62, 8
P.2d 467, 469 (1932)) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
The Perry court also noted (again, quoting Evans) that: "'the [single subject] provi-
sion is not to receive a narrow or technical construction in all cases, but is to be con-
strued liberally to uphold proper legislation, all parts of which are reasonably
germane.'" Id. at 92, 207 P.2d at 50 (emphasis added) (quoting Heron v. Riley, 209 Cal.
507, 510, 289 P. 160, 161 (1930)).
See also Fair Political Practices Comm'n v. Superior Court, 25 Cal. 3d 33, 559 P.2d 46,
157 Cal. Rptr. 855 (1979).
170. 32 Cal. 3d at 245, 651 P.2d at 279, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 35 (quoting, in part, from
Amador, 22 Cal. 3d at 230, 583 P.2d at 1290, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 248) (emphasis added in
Brosnahan).
171. "[W]e merely respect this court's liberal interpretative tradition ... of sus-
taining statutes and initiatives which fairly disclose a reasonable and common sense
relationship among their various components in furtherance of a common purpose."
32 Cal. 3d at 253, 651 P.2d at 284, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 40.
For a critique of the court's approach in Amador and Brosnahan, see Comment, The
California Initiative Process: The Demise of the Single-Subject Rule, 14 PAC. L.J. 1095
(1983) (recommending adoption of the interdependence standard).
172. 34 Cal. 3d 251, 667 P.2d 149, 193 Cal. Rptr. 692 (1983). The defendant in this
case was arrested for possession of stolen property and, after being transported to a
police station and given Miranda warnings, was interrogated. He invoked his right to
remain silent and declined to answer any questions. Later, at the county jail, the de-
fendant was again given Miranda warnings and interrogated by a sergeant of the sher-
iff's department, who had been aware of defendant's previous refusal to testify.
During this second session, defendant confessed to the robbery. Since the court had
determined that Proposition 8 would not operate retroactively, pre-Proposition 8 case
law was applied. Under this prior case law the confession was ruled illegal and there-
fore inadmissible.
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court allowed a confession into evidence which was admissible under
Michigan v. Mosley173 (federal law) but was inadmissible under Peo-
ple v. Pettingill174 (pre-Proposition 8 California law). Smith appealed
his conviction on the ground that the confession was improperly ad-
mitted. The state contended that the federal precedent should be ap-
plied under the authority of Proposition 8, even though the offense
was committed before its effective date.
Reversing the conviction, the California Supreme Court held that
Proposition 8 could not be applied retroactively. Based on statements
in the voter's pamphlet, the court reasoned that the initiative was
designed to prevent future crime and that retroactive application
would not serve such a purpose.' 75 The court further noted that the
substantive-procedural mixed nature of the Proposition might make
its retroactive application unconstitutional as an ex post facto law.176
In order to avoid any doubts as to the constitutionality of Proposition
8, the court refused to apply the initiative to any crime committed
before June 9, 1982.177
173. 423 U.S. 96 (1975). Defendant, after being arrested on robbery charges, was
given proper Miranda warnings. When defendant indicated that he did not want to
discuss the robberies, the detective immediately ceased interrogation. After an inter-
val of over two hours and following a second reading of Miranda rights, the defendant
made an inculpatory statement in response to another detective's questioning about an
unrelated murder. The Court held that the admission of the incriminating statement
made during the subsequent questioning did not violate Miranda, because defendant's
right to cut off questioning surrounding the robberies was scrupulously honored and
the subsequent questioning about the homicide was consistent with a reasonable inter-
pretation of his earlier refusal to answer questions about the robbery. Id. at 107.
174. 21 Cal. 3d 231, 578 P.2d 108, 145 Cal. Rptr. 861 (1978). After being arrested for
a burglary, defendant was given Miranda warnings and asked if he wanted to talk
with the police. Defendant declined. Two hours later, the same officer again gave Mi-
randa warnings to the defendant and asked him if he wished to discuss the burglary
arrest. Again defendant declined. Over 60 hours later, a police detective from another
county once again gave Miranda warnings to the defendant and began questioning him
about four unrelated burglaries in the other county. During the interrogation, defend-
ant confessed to the four burglaries. The California Supreme Court excluded the con-
fession, on the ground that once a suspect indicates he wishes to assert his right to
remain silent, it is unlawful for police to continue or renew the interrogation, and any
statement elicited thereafter is inadmissible. Id.
175. 34 Cal. 3d at 253, 667 P.2d at 152, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 695. But see Justice Richard-
son's dissent, in which he suggested that the immediate implementation of Proposition
8 would in fact operate to deter future crime. Id. at 273, 667 P.2d at 162, 193 Cal. Rptr.
at 705 (Richardson, J., dissenting).
176. A statute has an ex post facto effect when it alters the situation of the accused
to his disadvantage by: 1) making criminal an action that was innocent when done; 2)
making more serious an act that was already criminal when done; 3) inflicting greater
punishment than that prescribed for the act at the time it was committed; or 4) per-
mitting a person to be convicted with less than was required when the act was done.
People v. Sobiek, 30 Cal. App. 3d 458, 472, 106 Cal. Rptr. 519, 528, cert. denied, 414 U.S.
855 (1973).
177. 34 Cal. 3d at 262, 667 P.2d at 154, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 697.
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B. The Impact of Proposition 8
1. The Exclusionary Rule: In re Lance W.
On February 1, 1985, the California Supreme Court handed down a
decision that probably represents the most far-reaching impact of
Proposition 8 to date. The case was In re Lance W,178 involving the
vicarious standing rule as it relates to section 28(d) of the California
Constitution as amended by Proposition 8, the Truth-in-Evidence
provision. Since the case is so significant, resulting in the virtual ex-
tinction of the doctrine of independent state grounds for the exclu-
sionary rule in this area, it will be examined in some detail here.
The case arose as the result of observations by plainclothes police
officers of the defendant, Lance W., then 16 years old. On November
2, 1982,179 Lance was observed approaching several vehicles in a park
in which it was believed drug sales were taking place. Transfers of
items occurred between Lance and the occupants of several vehicles.
As Lance approached the officers' vehicle, one of them asked him if
he knew where to get some "smoke." Lance indicated that he did
not, then walked to a pickup truck and dropped a plastic bag into the
open window on the driver's side.
The officers then approached the truck, opened the door and re-
moved the bag which was found to contain marijuana. Neither of the
two occupants of the truck gave permission to open the door or to re-
move the bag. Lance was then arrested and searched. This search
revealed another plastic bag of marijuana and $35.00 in cash. Lance
was subsequently charged with possession of marijuana for sale.180
At trial, Lance moved to suppress the evidence obtained during the
search, as well as statements made at the time of his arrest. He ar-
gued that the warrantless search was improper, and undertaken
without probable cause. The trial court, relying on Remers v. Supe-
rior Court,181 concluded that the observations of the officers did not
establish probable cause for the search of the truck, nor for the
arrest and search of Lance. Accordingly, suppression of the evidence
under existing California case law was required.18 2
178. 37 Cal. 3d 873, 694 P.2d 744, 210 Cal. Rptr. 631 (1985).
179. Invocation of Proposition 8 was appropriate since this crime occurred after
June 9, 1982, its effective date. See supra notes 172-77 and accompanying text.
180. Lance W. was charged under CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11359 (West
Supp. 1985).
181. 2 Cal. 3d 659, 470 P.2d 11, 87 Cal. Rptr. 202 (1970).
182. There would have been no standing problem under California law. People v.
Martin, 45 Cal. 2d 755, 290 P.2d 855 (1955). See supra note 102.
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However, the trial court also recognized that Proposition 8, in ad-
ding section 28(d) to article I of the California Constitution, elimi-
nated any independent state ground for the suppression of the
evidence. Lance therefore lacked standing to contest the illegality of
the search on federal grounds, as enunciated in Alderman v. United
States18 3 and Rakas v. Illinois.184 The motion accordingly was denied
and the evidence admitted. On appeal, with the illegality of the
search conceded, the trial court result was affirmed. 8 5
Before the California Supreme Court, Lance argued that Proposi-
tion 8 did not eliminate California's vicarious standing rule for a
number of reasons. First, since Proposition 8 did not repeal either
section 13186 or section 24187 of article I of the California Constitu-
tion, he argued that section 13 provides an independent state ground
for exclusion. Second, he contended that the vicarious exclusionary
rule is merely a rule of procedure never intended to be affected by
Proposition 8. Third, he argued that Proposition 8 must be declared
unconstitutional insofar as it would require the admission of unlaw-
fully seized evidence which would be excluded under federal stan-
dards mandated by the United States Supreme Court. Fourth, he
urged the court to find that the amended section 28(d) constituted an
impermissible constitutional revision rather than an amendment, be-
cause it abrogated the exclusively judicial prerogative of fashioning
appropriate remedies for violation of constitutional rights. Fifth, he
argued that the new section 28(d) denied equal protection to criminal
defendants who may not now seek suppression on the same basis as
parties to civil litigation. Finally, Lance contended that reenactment
of section 1538.5 of the California Penal Codel88 reinstated the vica-
rious standing rule.
Justice Grodin, writing for the majority,18 9 first reviewed the fed-
eral law, which makes no provision for vicarious standing to chal-
lenge an illegal search. Justice Grodin noted that application of the
federal exclusionary rule has been restricted to areas where its reme-
dial objectives will be best served. Believing that use of the exclu-
sionary rule exacts a substantial social cost,190 the United States
183. 394 U.S. 165 (1969). See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
184. 439 U.S. 128 (1978). See supra note 99.
185. 149 Cal. App. 3d 838, 197 Cal. Rptr. 331 (1984).
186. See supra notes 5 and 18.
187. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
188. In August, 1982, two amendments were enacted that made minor procedural
changes to CAL. PENAL CODE § 1538.5 (West Supp. 1984). See supra note 25 for the rel-
evant portion of the statute, which was unchanged by the amendments.
189. Justices Kaus, Broussard, and Lucas concurred.
190. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978). "Each time the exclusionary rule is
applied it exacts a substantial social cost for the vindication of Fourth Amendment
rights. Relevant and reliable evidence is kept from the trier of fact and search for
truth at trial is deflected." Id, at 137.
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Supreme Court restricted its application to situations where the gov-
ernment seeks to use evidence incriminating the victim of the unlaw-
ful search. In other situations, the social cost involved is judged to
outweigh any potential deterrent effect.
Justice Grodin then compared California law to the federal stan-
dard. A broader application had been thought necessary in this state
"both to deter unlawful police conduct and to preserve the integrity
of the judicial process."191 Because of this broader purpose, the ex-
clusionary rule was "'applicable whenever evidence is obtained in vi-
olation of constitutional guarantees, . . whether or not it was
obtained in violation of the particular defendant's constitutional
rights.'"192 California's courts had reasoned that other remedies had
been ineffective and that admission of improperly obtained evidence
would involve the court in implied approval of the improper con-
duct.193 Under California's doctrine of independent state grounds,
this position was easily justified.
The court then addressed the defendant's arguments. First, agree-
ing with the defendant that Proposition 8 repealed neither section 13
nor section 24 of article I of the California Constitution, the court
found nonetheless that neither section mandated any basis for the
exclusion of evidence on independent state grounds. The court found
that Proposition 8 simply eliminated the exclusionary rule as a judi-
cially created remedy for conduct that would still amount to viola-
tions under the California Constitution.194 The court stated that the
191. 37 Cal. 3d at 883, 694 P.2d at 750, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 637.
192. Id. (quoting People v. Martin, 45 Cal. 2d 755, 761, 290 P.2d 855, 857 (1955)).
193. Id.
194. The court stated that:
The substantive scope of both provisions remains unaffected by Proposition
8. What would have been an unlawful search or seizure in this state before
the passage of that initiative would be unlawful today, and this is so even if it
would pass muster under the federal Constitution. What Proposition 8 does is
to eliminate a judicially created remedy for violations of the search and
seizure provisions of the federal or state Constitutions, through the exclusion
of evidence so obtained, except to the extent that exclusion remains federally
compelled.
37 Cal. 3d at 886-87, 694 P.2d at 752, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 639 (emphasis in original).
The obvious alternative interpretation was unmentioned by the court in In re Lance
W. In many cases, what the United States Supreme Court determined to be a reason-
able search, and therefore lawful, the California Supreme Court on independent state
grounds determined to be unreasonable, and therefore unlawful, It is possible that the
electorate intended not to eliminate a judicially created remedy, but rather to modify
the judicially created standard for finding an illegal search, i.e., to change the defini-
tion of an unreasonable search to comport with the federal standard. Therefore, what
was once illegal must now be considered legal. This analysis was, of course, unneces-
sary in Lance W. because the search was conceded to be illegal. See supra note 26.
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new section 28(d) added to the constitution by Proposition 8 is an
"unambiguous command .... 'Relevant evidence shall not be ex-
cluded' simply does not mean 'relevant evidence shall not be ex-
cluded unless it was seized in violation of article I, section 13.' "195
The court found also that the intent of the electorate was to abro-
gate the vicarious standing rule, contrary to the defendant's asser-
tion. Examining the language of the section together with its
legislative and electoral history, the court concluded that "the electo-
rate intended to mandate admission of relevant evidence, even if un-
lawfully seized, to the extent admission of the evidence is permitted
by the United States Constitution." 96 Since some exceptions were
provided within section 28(d) of the California Constitution,197 other
exceptions should not be implied or presumed pursuant to other sec-
tions, such as section 13. "That purpose [of the enacting body] cannot
be effectuated if the judiciary is free to adopt exclusionary rules that
are not authorized by statute or mandated by the Constitution."198
Defendant's third argument-that section 28(d) of the California
Constitution violates the United States Constitution-was dispatched
summarily by the court. Since the court concluded that Proposition 8
was intended to permit exclusion of unlawfully obtained though rele-
vant evidence only when required by the United States Constitution,
its amendment of the California Constitution is impliedly subject to
any applicable federal restrictions, and therefore cannot conflict with
federal law. Even if this were not the case, the court concluded that
Proposition 8 was intended only to apply to any situation in which it
is constitutionally permissible.
Lance W.'s argument that Proposition 8 constituted an impermissi-
ble revision to the constitution was already rejected in Brosnahan v.
Brown.199 That decision necessarily included the conclusion that sec-
tion 28(d) was itself proper, as well as adopted properly. Therefore,
this court concluded that since the people could, by amendment,
eliminate section 13 entirely, the adoption of the much narrower sec-
tion 28(d) by amendment was also permissible. Such an adoption
"cannot be considered such a sweeping change either in the distribu-
tion of powers made in the organic document or in the powers which
it vests in the judicial branch as to constitute a revision of the Consti-
tution .... "200
195. 37 Cal. 3d at 886, 694 P.2d at 752, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 639.
196. Id. at 887, 694 P.2d at 753, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 640.
197. Section 28(d) states that: "[n]othing in this section shall affect any existing
statutory rule of evidence relating to privilege or hearsay, or Evidence Code, Sections
352, 782 or 1103." CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(d).
198. 37 Cal. 3d at 889, 694 P.2d at 754, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 641.
199. 32 Cal. 3d 236, 651 P.2d 274, 186 Cal. Rptr. 30 (1982). See supra notes 164-65.
200. 37 Cal. 3d at 892, 694 P.2d at 756, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 643.
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The court also disposed of the defendant's equal protection argu-
ment with relative ease. Lance contended that, since section 28(d)
applies only to criminal proceedings, criminal defendants are being
treated differently than civil litigants who may still seek exclusion of
illegally obtained evidence under independent state grounds. How-
ever, as the court pointed out, this contention presumes the applica-
bility of the exclusionary rule to civil proceedings. The court cited
several cases in which a court had refused to apply the rule unless
the proceedings were deemed to be "quasicriminal." 201 Moreover,
the court concluded, even if the exclusionary rule were applicable to
civil proceedings, Proposition 8's focus on criminal procedure would
be constitutional because "[ult is constitutionally permissible for the
electorate to determine that the public stake in criminal proceedings,
and in assuring that all evidence relevant to the guilt of the accused
be presented to the trier of fact, justifies the admission of evidence
that would be excluded in other proceedings."202
Defendant's final argument, reduced to its essential terms, was
that the 1982 amendments to section 1538.5 of the Penal Code2O3 rees-
tablished violation of article I, section 13 as a basis for exclusion of
evidence. Because section 28(d) allows exceptions by statute enacted
by a two-thirds vote of each house of the legislature and because "[a]
section of a statute may not be amended unless the section is reen-
acted as amended," 20 4 defendant claims that the 1982 amendments to
section 1538.5 reenacted the section as originally adopted and applied
prior to adoption of section 28(d).
However, the 1982 amendments to the Penal Code were minor,
adopted unanimously as part of a non-controversial clean-up bill.205
The court rejected defendant's arguments, stating that "[w]e cannot
201. The cases cited includet Emslie v. State Bar, 11 Cal. 3d 210, 520 P.2d 991, 113
Cal. Rptr. 175 (1974) (declining to extend exclusionary rule to State Bar proceedings);
In re Martinez, 1 Cal. 3d 641, 463 P.2d 734, 83 Cal. Rptr. 382 (1970) (exclusionary rule
not applicable in parole revocation proceedings); People v. Moore, 69 Cal. 2d 674, 446
P.2d 800, 72 Cal. Rptr. 800 (1968) (exclusionary rule applicable in narcotic addiction
proceedings, based on close identity with aims and objectives of criminal law enforce-
ment); People v. One 1960 Cadillac Coupe, 62 Cal. 2d 92, 396 P.2d 706, 41 Cal. Rptr. 290
(1964) (exclusionary rule applicable, given these in rem proceedings' close identity
with aims and objectives of criminal law enforcement).
202. 37 Cal. 3d at 893, 694 P.2d at 756, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 644.
203. See supra note 25.
204. CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 9.
205. The summary of Assembly Bill No. 2984 prepared by the Senate Committee on
the Judiciary stated that: "The bill would also amend Sections 871.5 and 1538.5 of the
Penal Code. The Amendments are clean-up amendments to two other bills, SBs 1743
and 1744, which are pending on the Assembly floor on the consent calendar. The
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assume that the Legislature understood or intended that such far-
reaching consequences-virtually a legislative repeal of the 'Truth-in-
Evidence' section of Proposition 8-would follow an amendment so
casually proposed and adopted without opposition." 206 The court con-
cluded, therefore, that the amendment had neither the intent nor the
effect of restoring exclusionary rules abrogated by Proposition 8.
The dissent, written by Justice Mosk,207 makes three arguments
countering those of the majority. First, the dissent claims that the
majority interpretation of section 28(d) results, despite its assertion
to the contrary, in the implied repeal of section 13 and section 24 of
article I-a result contrary to the intent of the electorate, and con-
trary to principles of statutory construction. Second, the dissent con-
tends that the majority ignores not only principles for the
construction of the amendment, but also other judicial precedent re-
garding statutory construction. Finally, the dissent argues that the
consequences of the majority interpretation are absurd, in light of
the purported purposes of Proposition 8.208
The dissenting opinion begins with the premise that the majority's
interpretation of the constitutional amendment effected by Proposi-
tion 8 is so expansive as to repeal sections 13 and 24. Mosk cites the
well-settled principle of statutory construction that "'the two acts
must be irreconcilable, clearly repugnant, and so inconsistent as to
prevent their concurrent operation'" in order to overcome the pre-
sumption against repeal when two enactments appear inconsistent, 209
to argue for the reconciliation of section 28(d) with section 24 and
section 13 of the California Constitution. Section 24 was adopted in
1974 to codify the fundamental principle that the California Constitu-
tion is a document of independent force; section 13 provided the basis
for a judicial exclusionary rule necessary to give substance to pro-
tected rights. Because these provisions are so essential to the protec-
tion of constitutional rights, the dissent refused to accept the
argument that "such a firmly established and fundamental rule . ..
was impliedly overruled by the broad nonspecific language of Propo-
sition 8."210
Furthermore, the dissent argues, had the drafters of Proposition 8
intended repeal, they could have easily accomplished their result by
expressly repealing the contradictory sections. Since Proposition 8
amendments are not controversial." See 37 Cal. 3d at 894 n.14, 694 P.2d at 756 n.14, 210
Cal. Rptr. at 644 n.14.
206. 37 Cal. 3d at 894 n.14, 694 P.2d at 756 n.14, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 644 n.14.
207. Justice Mosk was joined by Chief Justice Bird and Justice Reynoso.
208. 37 Cal. 3d at 899, 694 P.2d at 761, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 648 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
209. Id. at 903, 694 P.2d at 764, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 651 (quoting from Warne v. Hark-
ness, 60 Cal. 2d 579, 587-88, 387 P.2d 377, 382, 35 Cal. Rptr. 601, 606 (1963)).
210. 37 Cal. 3d at 905, 694 P.2d at 765, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 652.
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expressly repealed another section of the California Constitution,2 11
the fact that no repeal was proposed in conjunction with section 28(d)
is evidence that no repeal was intended.212 There was not even any
mention of the intent to eliminate more all-encompassing state exclu-
sionary rules in the pre-adoption arguments of Proposition 8's propo-
nents. The Legislative Analyst did not indicate that unlawfully
seized evidence would become admissible unless excluded by the fed-
eral Constitution. "[T]hat there is no such statement anywhere in
the ballot materials indicates that the majority's interpretation ... is
not compelled. '213
The dissent's second argument rests on an interpretation of the
1971 California Supreme Court decision in Kaplan v. Superior
Court.214 That case was also a vicarious standing case in which the
court considered whether newly enacted Evidence Code section
351215 repealed an earlier judicial rule established in People v. Mar-
tin.216 Based on the fact that the drafters of the new evidentiary
statute were silent regarding the effect on the firmly established and
fundamental rule of Martin, but were not similarly silent in many
other less important areas, the Kaplan court concluded that such re-
vision was not intended. Using the same rule of statutory construc-
tion in this case, the dissent stated that "[i]n light of the 'deafening
silence' of a contrary intent ... it must therefore be concluded that
[the drafters] did not intend section 28(d) to abrogate the rule of vica-
rious standing or other independent state grounds for the exclusion
of evidence."2 17
Finally, the dissent argues that the majority's interpretation of the
new constitutional provision would lead to absurd results. Justice
Mosk contends that a rape victim's address and telephone number,
for example, could be introduced in open court, or a crime victim's
religious beliefs could be introduced and challenged. The dissent
211. Section 2 of Proposition 8 expressly deleted article I, section 12 of the Consti-
tution which afforded accused persons the right to be released on bail while awaiting
trial.
212. This argument ignores, however, the potential effect repeal of article I, section
24 would have on the remainder of the constitution. Independent state grounds are
not abolished by Proposition 8, but rather modified to exclude their invocation in the
area of criminal procedure.
213. 37 Cal. 3d at 905, 694 P.2d at 766, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 653.
214. 6 Cal. 3d 150, 491 P.2d 1, 98 Cal. Rptr. 649 (1971).
215. "Except as otherwise provided by statute, all relevant evidence is admissible."
CAL. EVID. CODE § 351 (West 1966).
216. 45 Cal. 2d 755, 290 P.2d 855 (1955). See supra note 102.
217. 37 Cal. 3d at 908, 694 P.2d at 768, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 655.
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views with some concern the use of specific instances of conduct to
attack the credibility of witnesses, arguing that these results would
run counter to the avowed purpose of Proposition 8-to implement
safeguards for victims of crimes and deal more harshly with violent
criminals-and could not have been intended.218
Although this case focuses on the effect of Proposition 8 on Califor-
nia's vicarious standing rule, the discussion of Proposition 8's Truth-
in-Evidence provision provides a far more general basis for California
courts' exclusionary rule decisions in the future. The court clearly
indicated that the doctrine of independent state grounds is no longer
a valid basis for exclusion of evidence. 219 Evidence must be admitted
to the extent permitted by the United States Constitution, regardless
of what California law may have been prior to passage of Proposition
8.
This case therefore displaces the California case law prior to Prop-
osition 8 that allowed an exclusionary rule even more restrictive than
the federal version. After Proposition 8, California prosecutors will
more easily be able to admit evidence, however obtained, to convict
the criminal.
2. Use of prior convictions: People v. Castro
The first comprehensive interpretation and application of Proposi-
tion 8 regarding the use of prior convictions for impeachment pur-
poses was undertaken by a California intermediate appellate court in
People v. Castro.220 In Castro, the defendant was convicted by a jury
of receiving stolen property. 221 Her only ground for appeal was that
218. This concern, however, ignores the narrow focus of the amendments to the
California Constitution enacted by Proposition 8. With respect to the examples in the
text, the amendment still requires that the evidence be relevant to be admissible. See
supra note 24. Neither of the examples mentioned in the text appear to be even mar-
ginally relevant to a criminal inquiry; in addition, an inquiry into religion obviously
presents that rare instance in which evidentiary questions rise to the level of constitu-
tional rights protected by the first amendment. Justice Mosk also uses, as an example
of a specific instance of conduct, a police-officer witness' expulsion from school for
cheating. Theoretically, according to the dissent, this information could be used to im-
peach the police officer acting as the prosecution's witness. However, the pertinent
constitutional amendment provides for unlimited use of prior felony convictions for
impeachment purposes. See supra note 36; see also infra notes 222-23 and accompany-
ing text. This remote and scarcely felonious example is subject to the general rele-
vance requirement of the other constitutional amendment. Even where such an
incident is deemed to be relevant, it may well be acceptable as a necessary cost in or-
der to achieve the overall purpose of the initiative.
219. Since this case involved the admission of concededly illegally obtained evi-
dence, it is presumed that the courts will have even less difficulty in admitting evi-
dence as mandated by federal law when the illegality of the search or seizure is merely
questionable.
220. 151 Cal. App. 3d 48, 198 Cal. Rptr. 645 (1984). See also People v. Juarez, 149
Cal. App. 3d 1104, 197 Cal. Rptr. 397 (1983).
221. CAL. PENAL CODE § 496 (West Supp. 1985).
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the trial court erroneously denied her pretrial motion to exclude evi-
dence of a prior conviction for possession of heroin.
The trial court concluded that section 28, subdivision (f) of article I
of the California Constitution (the Use of Prior Convictions provi-
sion) was more specific than section 28, subdivision (d) (the Truth-in-
Evidence provision) and was therefore controlling.2 2 2 At trial, the
defendant's prior criminal history came to light as a result of her
own testimony. Her prior convictions for possession of heroin and
possession of heroin for sale were later used to attack her credibility
as a witness.
Under pre-Proposition 8 case law, based on Beagle and its progeny,
it would have been error to fail to exclude the evidence since heroin
possession is not a crime involving dishonesty. However, since the
crime with which the defendant was charged occurred after the effec-
tive date of Proposition 8, the appellate court reexamined the case
law in light of the constitutional amendment.2 2 3 The court in Castro
found that the intent of the electorate was to permit the use of all
prior convictions for impeachment purposes, without limitation: "By
enacting Proposition 8, the electorate has decreed that all prior fel-
ony convictions indicate lack of honesty and veracity and are thus
relevant when offered to impeach a witness in a criminal proceed-
ing."224 The court thus overruled Beagle to admit evidence of prior
convictions, regardless of apparent lack of relevance or potential for
undue prejudice. 225
222. The trial judge stated:
I'm going to deny the motion, and I'll explain why .... Subsection (f) says
that prior convictions are admissible, notwithstanding any other limitations of
law. Subsection (d) says. . . that Section 352 applies to everything within the
section. I believe that it is very poorly written, and either (d) controls (f), or
(f) controls (d), and since (f) is more specific and refers only to the prior con-
viction issue, I'm going to hold that prior convictions are admissible. How-
ever, I hope and I'm sure that it will happen that the Court of Appeals will
resolve this discrepancy in the law.
38 Cal. 3d 301, 305 n.3, 696 P.2d 111, 112 n.3, 211 Cal. Rptr. 719, 720 n.3 (1985).
223. See 151 Cal. App. 3d at 52, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 647.
224. Id. at 56, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 650.
225. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(d) specifically indicates that the admissibility of rele-
vant evidence is still subject to the limitations of CAL. EVID. CODE § 352 (West 1966).
See supra notes 24 and 38. On the other hand, CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(f) contains no
such language. See supra note 36. The People v. Castro court dealt with this apparent
contradiction by attempting to discover the intent of the electorate through an exami-
nation of the arguments in favor of Proposition 8 as presented to the voters. 151 Cal.
App. 3d at 52-54, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 648-49. The court dealt with any remaining federal
constitutional impediment by holding that the operation of section 28(f) did not violate
due process or requirements for equal protection. Id at 56-59, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 651-52.
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A similar result was reached in a different California appellate dis-
trict at about the same time. In People v. Harrison,226 the defendant
was charged with attempted robbery and the use of a deadly weapon
in the commission of that crime. His pretrial motion to exclude the
use of a prior robbery conviction for impeachment purposes in the
event that he testified was denied. The defendant chose not to tes-
tify. Even though the defendant did not testify, the trial court al-
lowed the prosecutor to inquire whether the defendant had been
convicted of a prior felony involving theft.227
In affirming the conviction, the appellate court held that Proposi-
tion 8 was intended to abrogate the decisions of the long line of cases
based on the exclusionary rule enunciated in Beagle. "To hold that
the retention of Evidence Code section 352 in [the Truth-in-Evidence
provision] resurrected that line of authority would be to render [the
Use of Prior Convictions provision] mere ineffective surplusage." 228
The court found that the electorate expressly withdrew discretion
from the trial courts in this area and "necessarily determined that
valid felony convictions of any nature are relevant on the issue of a
witness's credibility."229
On June 5, 1984, the case of People v. Castro was argued before the
California Supreme Court, the first Proposition 8 case dealing with
the evidentiary use of prior convictions to be heard at the highest
state appellate level. The decision, 23 0 rendered on March 11, 1985,
does little to aid in the implementation of Proposition 8 with respect
to article I, section 28(f) of the California Constitution. Although the
defendant's conviction was upheld by all seven Justices, four separate
opinions were written, none of which were able to command a major-
ity. Moreover, the Castro opinions suggest that the court may impose
some judicial limitations on the impact of Proposition 8 in this area.
The California Supreme Court considered three challenges to the
trial court's interpretation and application of section 28(f) of article I
of the California Constitution, the amendment enacted by Proposi-
tion 8. First, Castro argued that section 28(f) did not abrogate section
352 of the Evidence Code,231 thereby eliminating the trial court's au-
226. 150 Cal. App. 3d 1142, 198 Cal. Rptr. 762 (1984).
227. See supa notes 159-61 for a discussion of a case involving a "sanitized" refer-
ence to a prior crime.
228. 150 Cal. App. 3d at 1156, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 771.
229. Id. at 1159, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 773. The court also found that People v. Barrick,
33 Cal. 3d 114, 654 P.2d 1243, 187 Cal. Rptr. 716 (1982), had been overruled by Proposi-
tion 8. Therefore, the court held, the trial court erred in sanitizing the conviction be-
cause it should have allowed the unlimited use of that conviction for impeachment
purposes. However, since the sanitization benefited the defendant, that error afforded
no grounds for reversing the conviction. 150 Cal. 3d at 1163, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 776-77.
230. 38 Cal. 3d 301, 696 P.2d 111, 211 Cal. Rptr. 719 (1985).
231. Id at 305-06, 696 P.2d at 113, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 721. See supra note 38 for the
text of this statute.
1102
[Vol. 12: 1059, 1985] Proposition 8
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
thority to exclude unduly prejudicial evidence. Second, Castro ar-
gued that, insofar as the trial court's authority is curtailed by section
28(f) in criminal proceedings, the failure to similarly curtail the trial
court's authority in civil proceedings constitutes a denial of equal pro-
tection. Third, the State Public Defender as amicus curiae argued
that the automatic admissibility of all prior felony convictions is a de-
nial of due process.232
The plurality opinion, written by Justice Kaus and joined by Jus-
tices Mosk and Broussard, held that section 28 "was not intended to
abrogate the traditional and inherent power of the trial court to con-
trol the admission of evidence by the exercise of discretion to exclude
marginally relevant but prejudicial matter. ... "233 In attempting to
set some guidelines for use by the trial courts, Justice Kaus further
held that "subject to the trial court's discretion under [Evidence
Code] section 352-subdivision (f) authorizes the use of any felony
conviction which necessarily involves moral turpitude, even if the im-
moral trait is one other than dishonesty."2 34 Prior convictions of
felonies which do not necessarily involve moral turpitude could not
be used.
After establishing that the holding applies to all witnesses,
whether or not the witness is the defendant, Justice Kaus reviewed
the history of section 352 and its application to evidence of prior con-
victions to impeach. The first case that applied section 352 to such
evidence was People v Beagle235 in 1972. Discussing a number of sub-
sequent decisions delineating the boundaries of permissible judicial
discretion in light of Beagle,236 Justice Kaus reasoned that the judi-
232. Id at 306, 696 P.2d at 113, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 721.
233. Id
234. Id.
235. 6 Cal. 3d 441, 492 P.2d 1, 99 Cal. Rptr. 313 (1972). See supra notes 133-40 and
accompanying text.
236. The following cases were cited by Kaus in his Castro opinion: People v. Bar-
rick, 33 Cal. 3d 115, 654 P.2d 1243, 187 Cal. Rptr. 716 (1982) ("sanitizing" a prior auto
theft conviction by calling it a "felony involving theft" is not allowed); People v. Fries,
24 Cal. 3d 222, 594 P.2d 19, 155 Cal. Rptr. 194 (1979) (court cannot admit a robbery
prior to impeach a defendant accused of robbery); People v. Woodard, 23 Cal. 3d 329,
590 P.2d 391, 152 Cal. Rptr. 536 (1979) (prior convictions for voluntary manslaughter
and felon in possession of a firearm had no bearing on truthfulness and should have
been excluded even though admission was sought to impeach a non-party witness);
People v. Rollo, 20 Cal. 3d 109, 569 P.2d 771, 141 Cal. Rptr. 177 (1977) (trial court erred
in admitting only the fact of the prior conviction, allowing defendant to disclose its na-
ture); People v. Rist, 16 Cal. 3d 211, 545 P.2d 833, 127 Cal. Rptr. 457 (1976) (trial court
abused its discretion in admitting a five-month-old robbery conviction in a robbery
prosecution when a two-year-old dissimilar conviction of credit card forgery was avail-
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cially-developed guidelines had, in fact, removed much of the discre-
tion of the trial court. He concluded that this severe restriction on
the court's discretion was the impetus behind the passage of section
28(f), intended to revitalize section 788 of the Evidence Code,237 coun-
tering the effect of Beagle.
To determine the extent to which the discretion of the trial court
was to be affected by Proposition 8's amendment of the California
Constitution in this area, Justice Kaus turned next to an examination
of the intent of the electorate. He first examined the wording of all
amending provisions of Proposition 8 to discover the voter's intent.238
Subdivision (f) of new constitutional section 28 mandates the use of
"[a]ny prior felony conviction . . . without limitation." Subdivision
(d)'s limitation presents an apparent conflict: "[n]othing in this sec-
tion shall affect . . . Evidence Code, [section] 352. . . ." On its face,
the wording in subdivision (d) limits the application of subdivision
(f), thereby leaving unaffected the trial court's ability to exclude
prior felony convictions pursuant to section 352.239
The plurality concluded that the intention of the electorate "was to
restore trial court discretion as visualized by the Evidence Code and
to reject the rigid black letter rules of exclusion which we had
grafted onto the code by the Antick [and Beagle] line of decisions." 240
Based on the literature supporting Proposition 8 as well as the Prop-
osition's subsections, the plurality reasoned that the public was dis-
satisfied with the appellate courts. Since "the initiative itself
expressed continued trust in the discretion of the trial courts"241 by
its recognition of section 352 in subdivision (d), the plurality con-
cluded that the discretion provided under section 352 was expressly
retained with respect to the entire initiative.
After determining that the trial court does retain some discretion
to exclude prior felony convictions under section 352 of the Evidence
Code, the plurality then addressed the question of what felonies
able); People v. Antick, 15 Cal. 3d 79, 539 P.2d 43, 123 Cal. Rptr. 475 (1975) (remote
prior convictions could not be used).
237. See supra note 37 for the text of this statute.
238. 38 Cal. 3d at 309, 696 P.2d at 115, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 723. As phrased in the plu-
rality opinion, the question in Castro is whether the voters "intended to abolish the
trial court's power under section 352 or merely to revert to the rule that, subject to
trial court discretion, priors are admissible to impeach." Id. Answering this question
becomes difficult because of the apparent conflict between section 28(d), which is spe-
cifically limited by section 352, and section 28(f), which makes no reference to section
352.
239. 38 Cal. 3d at 310, 696 P.2d at 115-16, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 723-24. The state argued
that, due to poor draftsmanship, subdivision (d)'s subordination of "this section" to Ev-
idence Code section 352, should be read as merely "this subdivision," leaving subdivi-
sion (f) as a grant of unlimited admissibility of prior felony convictions.
240. Id. at 312, 696 P.2d at 117, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 725. See supra note 236.
241. Id
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would be admissible to attack the credibility of a witness. The plural-
ity noted once again that the voters clearly wanted a change from the
current law of Beagle and its progeny. Therefore, since the trial
court may still exercise discretion, the plurality defined new stan-
dards for determining when exclusion will be appropriate, in accord-
ance with due process requirements set forth by the United States
Constitution.
In so doing, the plurality limited the "without limitation" language
of section 28(f) governing the admissibility of prior felony convictions
for impeachment purposes. Impeachment with prior convictions is
prohibited by due process if it cannot "'be said with substantial as-
surance that the credibility of a witness is adversely affected by his
having suffered [those] conviction[s].' "242 Therefore, the convictions
used must somehow be relevant to the veracity of the witness. A fair
trial cannot be achieved without this relevance requirement.243
To determine when a felony conviction relates to the credibility of
a witness, the plurality relied on the opinion of Justice Holmes:
(W)hen it is proved that a witness has been convicted of crime, the only
ground for disbelieving him which such proof affords is the general readiness
to do evil which the conviction may be supposed to show. It is from that gen-
eral disposition alone that the jury is asked to infer a readiness to lie in a par-
ticular case, and thence that he has lied in fact. The evidence has no tendency
to prove that he was mistaken, but only that he has perjured himself, and it
reaches that conclusion solely through the general proposition that he is of
bad character and unworthy of credit.
2 4 4
Based on this rationale, "if the felony of which the witness had been
convicted does not show a 'readiness to do evil,' the fact of conviction
simply will not support an inference of readiness to lie"245 and
should therefore not be allowed to attack credibility. Without evi-
dence of a readiness to do evil, there is no rational relationship be-
tween the prior conviction and the credibility of the witness.
Therefore, the plurality concluded, due process requirements neces-
sarily limit the "without limitation" language of the provision.2 46
242. Id. at 313, 696 P.2d at 118, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 726 (paraphrasing Leary v. United
States, 395 U.S. 6, 46 (1969)).
243. The court quoted from Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 131 n.6 (1968):
"'An important element of a fair trial is that a jury consider only relevant and compe-
tent evidence bearing on the issue of guilt or innocence.'"
244. 38 Cal. 3d at 314, 696 P.2d at 118, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 726 (quoting Gertz v. Fitch-
burg Railroad, 137 Mass. 77, 78 (1884) (emphasis added by the Castro court)).
245. Id.
246. Id. at 314 n.8, 696 P.2d at 119 n.8, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 727 n.8. The plurality cited
the following United States Supreme Court decisions for the proposition that infer-
ences must be based on a rational connection between the fact proved and the fact to
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The plurality determined that crimes that did not involve moral
turpitude of any kind could not be used. More difficult was deciding
to what extent crimes involving moral depravity other than dishon-
esty could be used. Although it is obviously easier to infer that a wit-
ness is lying if the prior conviction involves dishonesty as a necessary
element, the plurality held that "[t]here is. . . some basis-however
tenuous-for inferring that a person who has committed a crime
which involves moral turpitude other than dishonesty is more likely
to be dishonest than a witness about whom no such thing is
known."247
The holding of the plurality results in the necessity of determining,
in each case, if the prior conviction offered involves moral turpitude.
If it does, it is admissible, subject to exclusion in the discretion of the
trial court. The more tenuous the connection between the moral de-
pravity and dishonesty, the more likely it will be inadmissible for im-
peachment purposes.248
The final problem for the plurality was to determine if the trial
court could look only to the elements of the offense or if it could re-
ceive extrinsic evidence on the underlying facts. Reasoning that the
use of such extrinsic proof would create unfair surprise and confu-
sion of the issues, the plurality concluded that only the fact of the
conviction could be admitted. "Obviously . . . if the conviction is
only admissible if it evinces moral turpitude and such turpitude can
only be established through extrinsic evidence, confusion of issues
become inevitable and unfair surprise more than probable."249
The federal constitutional issues of due process and equal protec-
tion were not addressed at length in the plurality opinion. Since the
due process challenge was premised on the assumption that the trial
court would be deprived of discretion, and since the decision deter-
mined that the court retains discretion under Proposition 8, due pro-
cess was not at issue. The equal protection challenge was summarily
dismissed because the plurality found no authority for the proposi-
tion that the Constitution requires that rules of evidence in criminal
cases be the same as those applying to civil litigation.
be inferred: Ulster County Court v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 157 (1979); Barnes v. United
States, 412 U.S. 837, 844-45 (1973); Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 46 (1969). It fol-
lows from this proposition that a prior conviction of a witness must allow at least a
rational inference of dishonesty before that conviction may be used for impeachment
purposes.
In arriving at this conclusion, the court rejected the determination by the Supreme
Court of Washington that the legislature could reasonably have determined that there
was a rational nexus between the commission of any felony, regardless of whether or
not it involved moral turpitude, and that person's propensity to lie. State v. Ruzika, 89
Wash. 2d 217, 570 P.2d 1208 (1977).
247. 38 Cal. 3d at 315, 696 P.2d at 119, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 727.
248. Compare supra note 244 and accompanying text.
249. 38 Cal. 3d at 317, 696 P.2d at 120, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 728.
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Applying these rules of law to the facts involved in this case, the
plurality held that possession of heroin alone does not involve moral
turpitude and therefore cannot be used for impeachment. However,
the plurality reasoned that possession of heroin for sale does involve
moral turpitude, not because it indicates dishonesty directly, but be-
cause it indicates the intent to corrupt others. Since impeachment
with this conviction was therefore appropriate, the plurality affirmed
the conviction. 25 0
Justice Grodin wrote a concurring and dissenting opinion 2sl in
which he disagreed with almost all of the plurality's arguments.
First, he took a different view of the rules of statutory construction,
relying on California statutes252 to find that, since section 28(f) is
more specific than section 28(d), section 28(f) controls where any in-
consistencies appear. This is in complete agreement with the decision
by the trial court.25 3
According to Justice Grodin, the language of section 28(f) is clear
and unambiguous. In fact, "it is difficult to conceive how [the electo-
rate] could have found better language" 254 to ensure than any prior
convictions could be used for impeachment without limitation. Read-
ing the unambiguous language together with statutory rules of con-
struction left no doubt in Justice Grodin's mind that the voters did
not intend to limit section 28(f) by section 352 of the Evidence Code.
250. Possession of heroin for sale was the same felony which the court refused to
admit for the purpose of attacking credibility prior to the passage of Proposition 8 and
the amending of the California Constitution. People v. Spearman, 25 Cal. 3d 107, 599
P.2d 74, 157 Cal. Rptr. 883 (1979). The inquiry in Spearman was whether the crime
involved dishonesty under the standard of Beagle. The court stated that "moral hei-
nousness of an offense [does not] make it relevant on the issue of credibility." Id. at
115, 599 P.2d at 78, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 887 (citing People v. Woodard, 23 Cal. 3d 329, 590
P.2d 391, 152 Cal. Rptr. 536 (1970)). Here, after Proposition 8, the result is opposite.
Although the admission of a prior conviction of possession of heroin to impeach was
error, the error was not prejudicial because the jury knew of the defendant's criminal
past before the introduction of the prior convictions; the conviction of possession of
heroin for sale, as noted above, was deemed properly admitted, and the plurality there-
fore affirmed. 38 Cal. 3d at 319, 696 P.2d at 122, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 730.
251. 38 Cal. 3d at 319, 696 P.2d at 122, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 730 (Grodin, J., concurring
and dissenting).
252. Id. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1859 (West 1983), stating in part that "when a
general and particular provision are inconsistent, the latter is paramount to the for-
mer. So a particular intent will control a general one that is inconsistent with it." Id
253. 151 Cal. App. 3d 48, 54, 198 Cal. Rptr. 645, 658 (1984). See supra note 222 and
accompanying text.
254. 38 Cal. 3d at 319, 696 P.2d at 121, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 730. (Grodin, J., concurring
and dissenting). Justice Grodin noted in the alternative that any apparent inconsis-
tency could be avoided by reading the word "section" in subdivision (d) as "subdivi-
sion." Id. Compare supra note 239.
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Justice Grodin dealt with the constitutional due process argument
by analogizing the legislative and electoral history of the Proposition
to a comparable enactment in the District of Columbia. Following a
decision similar to the California Beagle opinion,25 5 Congress
amended the applicable statute to provide that prior convictions
"shall be admitted if offered."256 The same due process argument
raised by the public defender as amicus curiae in the Castro case was
used to challenge the amended District of Columbia statute. That
challenge to the District of Columbia statute was rejected in Dixon v.
United States.257 The same conclusion was subsequently reached by
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit which indicated that "'the public interest in getting before the
jury this evidence bearing upon the credibility of the defendant-wit-
ness outweighs its inescapably prejudicial effect.' "258 Based on the
persuasive reasoning and factual similarity of the District of Colum-
bia decision, Justice Grodin concluded that the due process argument
had no merit.
Justice Grodin agreed with the plurality in limiting, however mini-
mally, the admissibility of prior convictions, despite the explicit lan-
guage of the constitutional amendment. He accepted the "moral
turpitude" test proposed by the plurality because "evidence so poten-
tially prejudicial must at least meet a threshold constitutional stan-
dard of 'relevance.' "259 Since the problems of defining these
standards will give rise to difficulties in judicial administration, Jus-
tice Grodin suggested that the only viable solution would be for the
legislature to enumerate those crimes having a sufficient relationship
to dishonesty to be admissible. Finally, agreeing that admission of
the crimes in this case constituted harmless error in any event, the
Justice, like the plurality, affirmed the defendant's conviction.
Justice Lucas also wrote an opinion in Castro,260 concurring in the
result but dissenting from the plurality's analysis on two points.
First, he agreed with Justice Grodin that section 28(f) "was intended
to abrogate all judicially created restrictions upon the admissibility of
prior felony convictions, and to preclude the exercise of discretion to
exclude certain prior convictions pursuant to section 352 of the Evi-
dence Code."261
However, Justice Lucas departed from both the plurality's and Jus-
255. Luck v. United States, 348 F.2d 763 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
256. Act of July 29, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-358, 84 Stat. 473 (1970).
257. 287 A.2d 89 (D.C.), cert denied, 407 U.S. 926 (1972).
258. 38 Cal. 3d at 322, 696 P.2d at 124, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 732 (Grodin, J., concurring
and dissenting) (quoting United States v. Belt, 514 F.2d 837, 849 (D.C. Cir. 1975)).
259. 38 Cal. 3d at 322, 696 P.2d at 124, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 732 (Grodin, J., concurring
and dissenting).
260. Id. (Lucas, J., concurring and dissenting).
261. Id. (emphasis in original).
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tice Grodin's opinions and refused to recognize the creation of a
"moral turpitude" exception. Justice Lucas took his stand on the
plain language of section 28(f): that prior convictions shall be used
"without limitation." Recognizing the bare possibility of applicable
federal due process restrictions, he stated explicitly that he was una-
ware of any such restrictions and had been cited to no case imposing
any. The conclusion of Justice Lucas' opinion is emphatic, and nota-
bly clear in the context of the convoluted qualifications of the other
Castro opinions: "the commission of a felony offense necessarily
bears on one's credibility regardless of the nature of that offense. "262
A concurring and dissenting opinion was also written by Chief Jus-
tice Bird, joined by Justice Reynoso. 263 While agreeing that trial
courts retain discretion to exclude evidence of prior convictions
under Evidence Code section 352, Chief Justice Bird rejected the
moral turpitude standard proposed by the plurality and Justice
Grodin. Instead, she and Justice Reynoso would reaffirm the pre-
Proposition 8 Beagle standard as a guide to the trial courts in the ex-
ercise of their discretion.
The Chief Justice's opinion adopts the reasoning of a California ap-
pellate court opinion264 in which the court held that prior felony con-
victions must be relevant to the witness' credibility to be admissible
for impeachment purposes. The appellate court indicated that,
although the commission of any felony may reflect upon the charac-
ter of the individual, it is not necessarily probative of the truthful-
ness of that individual. To be admissible for impeachment purposes,
the crime for which the witness was convicted must involve some ele-
ment of dishonesty.
Chief Justice Bird adopted the lower court's two-step analysis to
determine the relevance of a prior felony:
Any rational theory of impeachment by a prior felony conviction requires
two inferential steps. First, the trier of fact must link the commission of the
felony, i.e., conduct, to some propensity in the witness to lie, i.e., a character
trait. From this propensity, the fact finder may then infer the witness is dis-
honest or untruthful. In the most obvious example, the fact finder hears evi-
262. Id. at 323, 696 P.2d at 125, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 733 (emphasis in original).
263. Id. (Bird, C.J., and Reynoso, J., concurring and dissenting).
264. Chief Justice Bird adopted virtually the entire opinion of Justice Work in the
case of People v. Hoffman, 162 Cal. App. 3d 376, 208 Cal. Rptr. 609 (1984). In that case,
involving a defendant charged with burglary, the trial court denied a motion before
trial to prevent the prosecution from impeaching with evidence of a prior conviction
for rape. On appeal, the conviction was reversed on the ground that a rape conviction
was not relevant to the credibility of the witness and therefore should not have been
admitted for impeachment purposes.
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dence of the witness's past conduct of making false statements under oath
from which he can infer the witness has a character trait for untruthfulness,
from which he may further infer the present testimony is likely incredible. 26 5
The Chief Justice rejected the moral turpitude standard of the plu-
rality, reasoning that the admission of any felony conviction as proba-
tive of credibility would totally eliminate the second inferential step,
and improperly so, because it is not necessarily true that all former
felons will lie under oath. Furthermore, an offer of past felonious
conduct may support other inferences such as a propensity for vio-
lence, thereby becoming unduly prejudicial. 2 66
Chief Justice Bird also rejected the moral turpitude standard be-
cause of lack of certainty in its application, enumerating examples of
the various definitional problems applied to the term.26 7 In addition
to the problems of definition, she noted that "trial judges will apply
their own personal views as to the mores of the community in decid-
ing whether an offense involves moral turpitude,"26 8 leading to in-
consistent results and requiring the reversal of many convictions.
She concluded by stating that "[t]he trial courts need clear guidance
as to which felonies are admissible to impeach the credibility of a wit-
ness. Today's decision not only lacks that clarity but is an open-
ended invitation to judicial chaos."269 Chief Justice Bird and Justice
Reynoso's opinion also affirms the conviction, but does not state the
grounds on which the conviction is upheld. Presumably, the Chief
Justice also believes that any errors committed by the lower courts
were not prejudicial to the defendant.
It is somewhat difficult to determine where we are left after the
Castro opinion. Although no more than three Justices could agree
completely, four did agree that the trial court does have some discre-
tion in this area and that a "moral turpitude" standard should be
used to determine the boundaries of that discretion. The difficulty,
of course, is in defining what crimes involve moral turpitude as a nec-
265. Hoffman, 162 Cal. App. 3d at 384, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 615.
266. 38 Cal. 3d at 328, 696 P.2d at 128-29, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 736-37. (Bird, C.J., and
Reynoso, J., concurring and dissenting).
267. United States ex reL Manzella v. Zimmerman, 71 F. Supp. 534 (E.D. Pa. 1947)
(never clearly or certainly defined and lacking in legal precision); In re Higbie, 6 Cal.
3d 562, 493 P.2d 97, 99 Cal. Rptr. 865 (1972) (an elusive concept, incapable of precise
general definition); In re Halliman, 43 Cal. 2d 243, 272 P.2d 768 (1954) (any crime or
misconduct committed without excuse); In re McAllister, 14 Cal. 2d 602, 603, 95 P.2d
932, 933 (1939) (contrary to justice, honesty, modesty or good morals); In re Craig, 12
Cal. 2d 93, 97, 82 P.2d 442, 444 (1938) ("an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the
private and social duties which a man owes to his fellowmen, or to society in general,
contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and
man"). See also In re Rothrock, 16 Cal. 3d 449, 106 P.2d 907 (1940); Yakov v. Board of
Medical Examiners, 68 Cal. 2d 67, 435 P.2d 553, 64 Cal. Rptr. 785 (1968); In re Boyd, 48
Cal. 2d 69, 307 P.2d 635 (1957); In re Hatch, 10 Cal. 2d 147, 73 P.2d 885 (1937).
268. 38 Cal. 3d at 334, 696 P.2d at 133, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 741 (footnote omitted).
269. I& at 336, 696 P.2d at 134, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 742.
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essary element. As Justice Tobriner has observed, "[t]erms such as
. . .'moral turpitude' stretch over so wide a range that they embrace
an unlimited area of conduct."270 Prosecutors will now direct their
arguments to the question of whether the prior conviction involved
moral turpitude as a necessary element, resulting in an entirely new
body of law to cover this area. Because of the definitional problems
"moral turpitude" presents, this new body of law is likely to be ex-
tremely contradictory and unpredictable at the appellate court level.
There is considerable uncertainty as to what the Castro decision
will do to the Beagle line of cases. The requirement that the prior
crime involve dishonesty apparently is overruled and replaced with
the moral turpitude standard. However, since at least a plurality of
the California Supreme Court has apparently determined that the
trial judge still has discretion to exclude under section 352 of the Evi-
dence Code, prior convictions could still be deemed inadmissible,
most probably where they are disallowed if they were so remote in
time or so identical to the crime alleged as to be unduly prejudicial.
The first requirement of admissibility is still relevance. Convic-
tions involving moral turpitude were found by a majority of the court
to contain the necessary element of relevance. However, it is not
clear that a remote crime would also be found to be relevant.
Although it is likely that the same crime will be relevant if it in-
volves moral turpitude, there are some hints that the trial court may
still have the discretion to balance this relevance against the poten-
tial for unfair prejudice in determining whether to admit the convic-
tion. No clear guidance as to these practical problems of the trial
court is offered by the supreme court.
Chief Justice Bird's conclusion is probably entirely correct insofar
as she characterizes the Castro decision as an invitation to judicial
chaos. Certainly there would be little disagreement on the part of
the proponents of Proposition 8's constitutional amendment with that
statement, or with her statement that trial courts need clear gui-
dance as to which felonies are admissible to impeach. Ironically,
however, the Chief Justice's solution-apparently to return to the
Beagle standard-not only ignores but also directly controverts the
clear guidance the new section 28(f) of article I of the California Con-
stitution provides, as enacted by Proposition 8 and as approved by the
people of California. Almost as ironically, Justice Grodin would turn
270. Morrison v. State Bd. of Educ., 1 Cal. 3d 214, 224-25, 461 P.2d 375, 382, 82 Cal.
Rptr. 175, 182 (1969).
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to the legislature for definition, apparently oblivious to the clear gui-
dance the constitutional amendment offers to legislature and courts
alike.
With the single exception of Justice Lucas, the California Supreme
Court in Castro appears to be entangled, at least for now, in the judi-
cial chaos their multiple opinions invite. The implementation of
Proposition 8's clear guidelines in this area must await another day in
court; it seems reasonable to predict, given the need for that clarity
that was very nearly the only issue upon which the Justices could all
agree, that the trial courts and appellate courts of California will fol-
low the lead of the trial and appellate courts in Castro, resulting in
more cases presenting the opportunity for definitive and appropriate
California Supreme Court review in the years to come.
VI. CONCLUSION
With the passage of Proposition 8, the California voters expressed
their dissatisfaction with the state of California law as it relates to
crucial and highly publicized areas of criminal procedure. Proposi-
tion 8's constitutional amendments were aimed at the abolition of the
"independent state grounds" doctrine the California courts had em-
ployed in these areas to extend protection to criminal defendants be-
yond those rights mandated by the United States Constitution.
The principle involved behind constitutional amendment is that
the California Constitution, like any constitution, is to be a dynamic
expression of the most deeply-felt will of the people, not a static,
archaic artifact. It has long been recognized "that the people are free
to withdraw the authority they have conferred and, when withdrawn,
neither the Congress nor the courts can assume the right to continue
to exercise it."271 In the face of the clear language of the constitu-
tional amendments enacted by the people in Proposition 8, judicial
re-imposition of the restrictive standards of pre-Proposition 8 case
law would be in violation of the people's expressed will.
The California Supreme Court, with the Lance W. decision, has
recognized that the will of the people was expressed in Proposition 8.
The Castro case was not so clear. Some judicial restrictions have
been removed in Castro; the lack of certainty and clarity, as well as
the many unresolved issues of Castro, raise the hope that when those
issues are addressed, the mandate of the people in Proposition 8 will
be recognized in full.
A quote from California Supreme Court Justice Stanley Mosk
identifies the deeply-felt judicial need to which Proposition 8 as en-
acted offers at least an initial response:
271. United States v. Chambers, 291 U.S. 217, 226 (1934).
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I must concede there is an element of accuracy to the oft-repeated conten-
tion that "criminals have all the rights." This is elementary constitutional law.
One will look in vain among our Bill of Rights and among its counterpart in
the state constitution for guarantees to victims, or to the public, or to any per-
son other than the accused.2
7 2
Perhaps the public has taken the first step toward solving this prob-
lem by the passage of the Victims's Bill of Rights, amending the Cali-
fornia Constitution by Proposition 8. The rights of which Justice
Mosk spoke are now part of the California Constitution, properly en-
acted and consistent with the United States Constitution. Hence-
forth, the interpretations of the California courts must look to these
rights, however halting that judicial process may be at times, to make
California law.
MARK DYER KLEIN AND
RANDALL A. COHEN
272. Mosk, The Mask of Reform, 10 Sw. U. L. REV. 885, 889-90 (1978).
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